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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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BRIEFS

RUSSIAN OFFICERS ARMING BALUCHIS--Lahore, 2 Apr--MAJALLAT AL-AMAN, a newspaper in Beirut, printed a report based on information from Indian intelligence sources in its 28 March 1980 issue. According to this report, Russia is training and arming Baluchi tribes in southeastern Afghanistan so that it can reach the Arabian Gulf. According to these sources, between 3,000 and 4,000 Baluchis have been trained in the use of the latest weapons. More people are being trained in Kandhar. According to these sources, "this activity is being undertaken [for the alleged purpose] of making the route to the Arabian Gulf safe." The Lebanese newspaper's report says that the Baluchi tribes that live in the southeastern part of Afghanistan have relatives in Oman and countries around the Arabian Gulf. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 3 Apr 80 p 10] 7997

CSO: 4203

SONATRACH REORGANIZED, REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 12 May 80 pp 2-5

[Interview with four representatives of SONATRACH Nazim Zouioueche, vice president of Sonatrach Hydrocarbons, Mounir Ferghani, vice president for organization and planning, Mohamed Larbi Kateb, assistant vice president for Marketing and Said Aissi, director for the Local Market in the Marketing Division by Randa Takieddine; date and place not given]

[Text] Algeria, according to Oil Minister Belkacem Nabi, has decided in principle to abandon LNG as the means for exporting its natural gas. In an interview with the Paris daily LE MATIN, Mr Nabi said last week that revenues from sales of oil were sufficient to meet Algeria's foreign currency needs. "I can reveal to you that Algeria is ready to give up the exploitation of LNG", he added. "The decision, in principle, has been taken at the highest political level."

Asked whether it was reasonable to take such a step after Algeria's massive investment in LNG, Mr Nabi declared: "I repeat that Algeria is ready, if necessary, to put an end to the LNG experience. But we are willing to sell natural gas to France and to Europe."

Mr Nabi's statement could be interpreted as yet another thrust in the psychological skirmishing going on between Algeria and its customers for LNG, notably the El Paso Natural Gas Company in the US, over the increases in price that Algeria is demanding. But this is far from being the whole story: Algeria last week suspended its contracts with France's Technip and Foster Wheeler of the US for construction of its planned LNG-3 plant at Arzew and there has been ample evidence in recent months that Algeria would prefer to boost its deliveries of gas to Europe through trans-Mediterranean pipelines.

To help pace Algeria's gas and oil development policies in context, Sonatrach, the state-owned hydrocarbons group, drew aside its customary veil of secrecy and permitted a small group of foreign newsmen to question four of Sonatrach's senior executives. One of those at the meeting in Algiers was AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO's Randa Takieddine.

The four representatives of Sonatrach are Nazim Zouioueche, Vice President of Sonatrach Hydrocarbons, Mounir Ferghani, Vice President for Organisation and Planning, Mohamed Larbi Kateb, Assistant Vice President for Marketing, and Said Aissi, Director for the Local Market in the Marketing Division. Since, in some instances, more than one of the executives took part in answering questions, they have not been identified individually in the following transcript of their collective interview which follows:

Sonatrach Split Into Parts

Algeria last week announced that its state hydrocarbons group Sonatrach had been split into a number of smaller organisations. A decree published in the official gazette as this newsletter was going to press said that three new companies had been formed to take over some of Sonatrach's operations.

One of the new companies will handle surveys and carry out oil, gas and petrochemical projects; another will process crude for export and control distribution of refined products at home; the third will produce and market plastics and synthetic rubber.

Analysts were quoted in Algiers as saying that the move had been expected for some time in the interests of efficiency; Sonatrach, which generates more than 90 per cent of Algeria's foreign exchange earnings, employs 85,000 people.

The move comes shortly after Kuwait carried out a reverse operation, merging the marketing and transport sectors of its oil industry into a single state company in order to increase control over the industry (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, April 21).

Q: What is your policy on delivering gas by pipeline?

A: The possibility of transporting gas by submarine pipeline has now been proven. We have therefore not excluded the possibility of doubling the gas pipeline that is already being built (across the Mediterranean to Sicily and Italy) in our planning for the future. But any variations in our investments in developing gas will depend upon the energy market and, in particular, on the results we obtain insofar as readjustment of the price of gas is concerned.

It (expansion of gas deliveries by pipeline) is therefore a possibility for the years to come; there are feasibility studies being carried out, but no decisions have been taken so far.

Q: What, then, would be the price for gas which would enable you to complete your investment programme, notably to double the capacity of the gas pipeline so that it would be profitable to you? Also, what ought the selling price be to consumers?

A: As to the profitability of investments in gas, the current price does not provide Algeria with any return. But it would be a rather hazardous exercise to give you a price threshold for gas through a pipeline for which work on the technical and economic aspects is still incomplete. I think our investment policy for gas depends more on the results of the negotiations we are holding with our customers. If the negotiations turn out well, Algeria will be encouraged to press forward. Technically, the gas pipeline is feasible. We would like to deliver more gas by pipeline. At present, the envisioned capacity is about 15 billion cubic meters (a year).

Q: Are the American negotiations further advanced than those for Gaz de France and other countries?

A: These negotiations are linked together in the sense that what we are negotiating about is the conditions for the sale of gas and the price. As for the Americans, our delegations have met only once, but we will be meeting them again. Our talks with Gaz de France, have been continuing for some time. As to whether one set of talks have advanced further than others, I think it is difficult to say at this stage. Our conversations have been very useful and our positions are very open.

Q: Have the discussions been concerned with the overall problem rather than details up until now?

A: Oh no. That is to say that we have discussed the entire problem but we have also gone into detail over certain questions.

Q: Have there been negotiations on the duration of the contracts?

A: No, we have not discussed the duration of contracts. But it is a fact that this is a question that is linked to the overall conditions for the sale of gas.

Q: Are deliveries to El Paso still halted?

A: Yes. It is, however, El Paso that has ceased to take gas from us. Given the fact that there has been no agreement either on a provisional price or on a final price, which has still to be fixed either upwards or downwards, and given that the signed undertaking has not been approved by the Algerian authorities, it was no longer possible for El Paso to take delivery of our gas.

Insofar as Gaz de France is concerned, the situation is rather different. As you know, we asked for a review of prices and Gaz de France decided unilaterally to pay a certain price. Deliveries have not been cut off and the discussions continue.

Q: Are discussions continuing with other gas companies?

A: We have contracts with other companies. But there have not been any deliveries to Belgium's Distrigas, to Ruhrgas of West Germany or Gazuni. These contracts cover deliveries to begin in the future. They are not yet operational.

Q: You are linking gas prices to your investment in developing your gas resources. Assuming that you increase the amount of gas that you deliver by pipeline, will this not have a beneficial effect on the development of your gas fields without the need for an increase in price?

A: As to deliveries to Italy, there is a contract and there is a price in this contract. There are also provisions for renegotiation of prices. The new prices have not yet been renegotiated, however.

Q: Are you going to include in your new gas contracts a clause which would make provision for something like the \$3 per barrel premium you are charging for oil for exploration or investment?

A: At present, there are no new gas contracts although there are a number of companies interested in buying gas. As to a premium which would be the equivalent to the one we charge for crude oil, nothing has been decided at present.

Q: Have any of your clients refused to pay the oil premium because of recent market conditions?

A: No.

Q: At the Hassi Messaoud oilfield we were told that production had fallen between 1978 and 1979. Is it your policy to lower output? Are you envisaging putting aside a portion of your oil for petrochemicals?

A: I don't think there was a fall in production at Hassi Messaoud between 1978 and 1979. There has been a reduction there from 1979 to a lower rhythm of output in 1980 because we have cut back at a certain number of wells from the beginning of this year. But not for commercial reasons. Only for purely technical reasons, given the fact that hydrocarbons are a source of foreign currency revenues and given that it is desirable for our country to earn foreign currency revenues.

A decision has been taken to adopt a much more restrictive policy over some of our wells in order to conserve resources. This applies in particular to wells which are already in secondary production, and which are being made to produce at a more acceptable rate than has been the case for secondary production at Hassi Messaoud in the past.

Secondly, output has also been cut back for wells in which the oil contains a great deal of associated gas while we wait for the installation of equipment to recover this gas which would otherwise be flared.

Finally, we have cut back at some wells where a lower rate of output would mean a higher recovery rate. But our output depends in part on the level of foreign currency earnings which the country requires. Then, technical criteria enter the picture--and it is on the basis of these technical criteria that we determine the level of output from our oilfields.

Q: What was discussed at the recent OPEC meeting on gas?

A: There was a meeting of the committee concerned with gas. Among the subjects discussed was the price levels for the sale of gas and I think that our partners were able together to formulate a number of quite precise ideas on this.

Q: Can you elaborate a little on this?

A: I was not at the meeting, so I cannot elaborate on what was done there. The discussions are continuing, but I cannot tell you what OPEC will decide to do.

Q: Will these questions be discussed at Taif on May 7?

A: Perhaps.

Q: Have you been in contact with Japanese companies on possible sales of gas to them if there is a breakdown in your talks (with the Americans and Europeans)?

A: No, Sonatrach has not contacted Japanese companies. But some Japanese companies have had dealings for quite some time with Sonatrach, notably in the framework of their purchases of oil.

Q: Are there other potential markets for Algerian gas in addition to Japan?

A: I will ask you a question: do the consuming countries have other sources of LNG? As far as I know, there are only a limited number of LNG liquefaction plants in the world. There is one at Brunei, which is intended entirely for Japan; you have one at Abu Dhabi which is intended entirely for Japan; you have the one in Alaska which is also intended entirely for production to Japan; you have the small unit at Mersa Brega in Libya which is to serve only the Italian market. The only new LNG project which appears to be coming into existence is the Nigerian one and, with the Nigerian project still at a very early stage, one cannot envisage a new project coming on stream until 1985 or afterwards.

Q: In the meantime, are you prepared to freeze your gas production?

A: It is not a question of freezing or not freezing. At present, we are negotiating on prices. We have asked for entirely reasonable prices because they will enable us to index prices on a form of energy which is exactly the same as LNG.

Q: What if your clients do what they have done over Iranian oil. Have you alternatives in sight?

A: In any event, we will not be prepared to sell our gas at just any price because we have to sell the gas. Why should we sell at any price?

Q: Because you need foreign currency?

A: At present, our revenues from gas represent about 6 per cent of the revenues of the entire hydrocarbons sector. Liquid petroleum accounts for the vast bulk of our hydrocarbons earnings. If prices stay the same, this 6 per cent share will presumably increase, but not in any way in accord with the amount of gas that is sold. This means that, in order to struggle to reach a 10 per cent share, it would be necessary to quadruple our sales gas.

Q: Do you include condensates in your figures for gas revenues?

A: No, condensates are not included. Condensates are liquid and, in any case, they could be sold regardless of whether there are sales of gas.

Q: Is your policy on oil production in 1980 one of reducing output?

A: It is not one of reduction but of conservation. I have already mentioned the wells that are rich in associated gas. Gas recovery equipment is in the process of being installed. When this equipment is ready, there will then be absolutely no reason for holding back output because the gas will not be flared. What is important for us is to prevent flaring. Conservation may mean a reduction this year, but it could mean an increase next year. Quite simply, what is involved is an attempt to respect a number of technical criteria that are compatible with the nature of our oil and gas deposits.

One should add that the coming on stream of the new refinery at Skikda means that refined products are being sold instead of crude oil and that crude oil exports are thus reduced. The refinery has already begun working--the first column is in service and the first shipment of naphtha has already departed. The target throughput for the Skikda refinery is 15 million tonnes for 1980. It is not the only refinery in Algeria, but it will be the biggest one.

Q: If Iran stops exporting oil, will you increase your output?

A: After taking into account the foreign currency requirements of our country, we have been acting in accordance with a number of technical criteria leading to a strict policy of conservation. This is a policy that has been decided upon at the highest level in the country and this is the policy which we will follow.

Our output today is at a level which is compatible with the best level of recovery of oil. This is important.

Q: Up until the last crisis, the oil exporting countries made up for sharp falls in production by certain of their members. Are we to expect to see in future the other countries making no attempt to make up for a heavy fall in output by one of the big producers?

A: First of all, Algeria is not a major oil producer and we could never be expected to make up for, say, the loss of output from Iran.

Q: What is your current production of oil?

A: About 1 million b/d--982,000 b/d.

Q: At current levels of output, how long will your oil deposits last?

A: I am really not in a position to tell you today. This is because we are re-examining all of the mathematical models for our oilfields. Our previous production forecasts were made in accordance with a different rhythm--everything depends on the rhythm of production and this varies from one oilfield to another.

You have no doubt heard about the Valhyd Plan (under which oil revenues were to be invested in developing Algeria's gas fields) and of a rise in production and then a fall in output of oil sometime in the 1990s. What we are trying to do now is to maintain a production plateau for as long as possible, to satisfy the country's requirements for as long as possible and to keep the refinery working for as long as possible.

If you ask me whether we will still be producing oil in the year 2010, the answer is yes. But I cannot tell you whether our output then will be 12 million tonnes a year or 30 tonnes. At present, Algeria has recoverable reserves of about 1.1 billion tonnes of oil. Divide this 1.1 billion by the figure of your choice and you will have the number of years of production that you want.

Q: What are your exploration plans?

A: The new five-year plan is to be approved by the FLN Congress and we are proposing a major exploration programme. We would like to see a doubling of our exploration efforts from 1981 onwards by comparison with that of preceding years. This is because we believe that there are sedimentary basins in Algeria which are likely to contain hydrocarbons--either oil or gas. We are proposing expenditure on exploration during the next five-year plan of the order of AD 12 billion (about \$3 billion).

Q: Does this include foreign participation in exploration?

A: We have not taken into account foreign participation when drawing up our budget. The budget we propose is one for Sonatrach alone. Regardless of whether exploration contracts with foreign companies bear fruit, we have drawn up a budget for five years in cooperation with the Oil Ministry and in accordance with recommendations from the FLN Central Committee. But in fact, our own planning is for 10 years and we are already working on the second five-year period.

Q: What is the current status of your relations with foreign companies concerning exploration?

A: There have been talks with almost all of the big and medium-sized companies about exploration permits within the framework of existing agreements. These talks should lead to the signature of agreements with a certain number of companies in the near future, probably this year. But you must realise that exploration agreements are like laws and must be passed like laws: they have to be approved by the ministry, by the government and, probably, by the People's Assembly.

Q: Who is involved?

A: Just about everybody. If you want names, there are Exxon, BP, Shell, the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, Gulf, Texaco, the Japanese...just about everybody.

Q: Are the exploration permits to be allocated in accordance with new criteria?

A: Yes, there has been a modification--and this is where the \$3 per barrel exploration charge comes in. I would like to stress that the \$3 does not represent a surcharge. What we have done is to point out to our clients that, in order to continue to produce oil, we need to undertake exploration--and this exploration is very costly. We have therefore asked them to participate with us in exploration.

This means that the companies pay \$3 on each barrel of oil that they lift and this money is paid into a special account. When an exploration agreement is concluded, the company ceases to pay \$3 per barrel and the money that it paid previously into the exploration account is transferred to an exploration fund on the basis of negotiations.

Sonatrach has proposed granting a certain number of permits. Companies that want to take part in exploration will then propose a programme--so much seismic work, so many exploration wells, etc.--which will then be discussed. If these discussions lead to an agreement, then an exploration budget is drawn up. The money that has been paid in previously then becomes the first contribution to this budget.

There has also been a modification in the return to the company in the event of a discovery. In the past, it was 49 per cent (for the company) and 51 per cent (for Algeria). Today, the return (for the company) varies between 50 and 49 per cent depending on the size of the discovery and other factors. A second point is that, in the event of a discovery, the cost of discovery must be written off (a fonds perdu).

CSO: 4420

OIL MINISTER INTERVIEWED, DEMANDS PARITY FOR LNG

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 5 May 80 pp 2-5

[Interview with Belkacem Nabi, oil minister by Randa Takieddine, date and place not given]

[Text] It is usually, though not always plausibly, argued in OPEC circles that the price of crude oil is determined solely by market forces; customers should not complain about prices, the argument runs, since prices are in part a reflection of their demand for the product. The argument applies by extension to other sources of energy, such as natural gas.

In an exclusive interview with AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO's Randa Takieddine in Algiers last week, however, Algerian Oil Minister Belkacem Nabi took a different tack. It was, he said, quite simply unjust that LNG prices should 1) have fallen over the past 15 years and 2) dropped below parity with crude prices; he did not say why it was unjust, nor did he address himself to the question whether LNG prices were determined by market forces.

In what will probably prove a controversial interview, the Algerian minister also said that LNG prices should be at least on a par with oil prices because LNG is an alternative energy source. It is often argued by OPEC hawks like Libya that crude prices should rise close to the price of alternative energy sources; Mr Nabi takes the view that alternatives to oil should "inevitably" cost more.

While in Algiers, Randa Takieddine also attended a restricted press conference given by the Vice-Presidents of the national hydrocarbons group Sonatrach. There is insufficient space in this week's issue of AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO to report in detail on this important event; we shall therefore be publishing a report in our May 12 issue.

The interview follows:

Q: American sources have told us that it will be very hard for the US to pay the price Algeria is asking for its LNG when Canadian and Mexican gas

is so much cheaper. They also say the US can afford to hold out on this, because the El Paso deal covers only about 2 per cent of the country's total energy needs. Finally, they say that if the deal falls through, Algeria will be the bigger loser.

What is your reaction to all this?

A: The importance of these negotiations goes beyond the El Paso deal. Even as far as the US is concerned, we are not talking about 2 per cent, but about 3 or 4 per cent of their energy needs; it is important to bear that in mind, given the role that natural gas plays in the American economy. I think it's a little premature to talk about who will be the bigger loser.

We do not think it unjust that Algeria should receive as much for its LNG as other gas-exporting countries; in particular, we think it is unfair that the US charges much more per cubic metre for the LNG it sells to Japan than we charge for the LNG we export to the US.

Moreover, we think it is wrong that the price of LNG should have fallen constantly since 1964. In that year the price of one therm of LNG was almost double that of a therm of crude. In 1969, when the first CAMEL contract was signed, parity had been reached between the two kinds of energy. Today, the price of a therm of LNG is about 75 per cent of that of a therm of oil.

It is especially unfortunate that the price of natural gas should be lower than that of oil at a time of energy crisis, when LNG is an alternative source of energy and hence one which should inevitably cost more.

Q: You are asking for \$6.00 per million BTUs, exclusive of transport costs. The Americans claim that the price of LNG exported from Abu Dhabi to Japan includes transport costs and that the real price is about \$3.00.

What price are you willing to settle for? Are you prepared to go below \$6.00?

A: If you look at the official prices, published by Abu Dhabi, you will see that the sales price of their LNG to Japan is \$5.36 per million BTUs: this includes \$0.70 for transport, which means that the real cost is \$4.66 fob.

However, the Algerian government has not for the time being decided to fix a price unilaterally. We are talking about the terms of a trade agreement, which are worked out to the mutual satisfaction of seller and buyer. We have not yet reached the position of a country like Canada, whose government fixes the price of its LNG exports.

Q: Are you saying that \$6.00 is not Algeria's asking price?

A: As far as I know, we have never mentioned the figure of \$6.00 per million BTUs. Personally, I have never argued for this or that price.

What Algeria is seeking is the application of a principle. We want it accepted that the price of natural gas should not fall in relation to the price of oil, especially in times of energy crisis. We have told the Americans that the least we can accept is parity between gas and oil prices.

Q: If the talks break down, how are you going to market your gas, given that the West Europeans do not yet have terminals big enough to cater for the giant LNG tankers currently serving Japan and the US?

A: If you are going to be the prisoner of one country, it is better to be aware of the fact as soon as possible. If the LNG-1 contract with the Americans is going to make the Algerian economy dependent on the US to the extent you suggest, it is better that we know it now. As for what we shall do, we shall see.

Q: Might you increase your oil production if your sales of gas drop?

A: We shall take the decisions necessary to make our economy as independent as possible.

Q: Is that also because of a dispute over prices?

A: We have not yet got down to brass tacks, although we have outlined our point of view.

Q: The vice-presidents of Sonatrach have said that gas sales represent about 6 per cent of the company's revenues. How high would you like to see that figure go?

A: I should like it to stay at 6 per cent if the alternative is to make Algeria's economy more dependent. I have heard it said here and there that we shall be less independent if we increase our LNG exports: that would mean limiting our ability to decide for ourselves. We have always refused to sell a single crumb of our independence.

Q: Does the price charged by Canada to the US for its LNG seem reasonable to you or not?

A: Canada and the US are neighbouring countries whose economies are intimately inter-connected; the price of Canadian LNG to the US must be analysed in that specific context.

Moreover, Canada is buying and selling gas at the same time; the price charged is thus one which concerns two countries in a very precisely defined context.

We must also make a distinction between LNG shipped by tanker and natural gas transported by pipeline. Nuclear energy, LNG, crude oil and natural gas all end up serving the housewife or the industrialist; the fact that the end user is the same does not make them the same kinds of energy; neither does it mean that the kilowatt of nuclear energy should cost the same as a kilowatt of oil-fired energy.

Q: On May 7, you are due to go to Taif for a meeting of OPEC ministers. During the meeting of the Strategic Committee at London in February, there was talk of having OPEC adopt regular indexation of prices. Will the system be adopted at Taif and when could it likely to become operational?

A: Details have been published in certain specialised journals, but what you are referring to is a document on which a number of countries have yet to give their opinion. When lengthy extracts are published, this is not very pleasant for countries which are not members of the Strategic Committee. We regret this very much.

It is not, however, betraying a secret if I tell you that the proposed text fixes a minimum threshold for increasing the price of a barrel of oil--a sort of SMIC (minimum wage) for crude oil. The aim of this minimum threshold would be to make up for the effects of inflation and to increase in real terms the purchasing power of crude oil by a certain percentage. The statistics to be used to calculate the annual erosion of the purchasing power of a barrel of oil and what improvement there should be to purchasing power of that same barrel of oil are the aggregate figures of industrial countries which are published by organisations in those countries. There are some people, however, who feel that to take into consideration only the characteristic elements of economic activity in industrial countries does not provide a guarantee for petroleum exporting countries and they feel that illogical not to take into account the characteristic elements of economic evolution in OPEC countries or in the Third World.

Q: Is that Algeria's position?

A: Yes, and it is a position that is also shared by members of the Strategic Committee.

Q: Isn't the Taif conference a meeting of the Strategic Committee?

A: No, it is an extraordinary meeting of OPEC ministers.

Q: If there is an agreement on the indexation mechanism, at what time would it come into effect?

A: We still have to debate this question--and it is an important one.

Q: Turning to the question of oil prices and the unification of OPEC prices, do you think that if Saudi Arabia raised the price of Arabian Light to say \$30 a barrel there is a hope for reunification of oil prices?

A: Frankly, I don't know what people mean when they talk of a reunification of prices. Let us suppose that Saudi Arabia goes up to \$30, what relevance does this have for reunification? The present price of Algerian oil is \$34.21. Is this, or is it not in harmony with the Saudi price?

When I first entered OPEC I heard some members say that if you are thirsty in a desert, you will pay the same price for a glass of milk as for a glass of water or for a glass of the finest liqueur in the world in order to quench your thirst. In a general way, when there is an imbalance in the economy between supply and demand, what is the normal differential? I don't see what this means.

Q: You have spoken about an increase in prices, notably by Iran, and there is not an imbalance between supply and demand.

A: This is a political problem. It was not the \$2 or \$2.50 premium that Iran demanded which was turned down by that country's customers for large quantities of oil. Without any doubt, there have been political considerations colouring the policy adopted when dealing with Iran on this issue.

Q: But isn't the decision by Iran to raise its prices also a political question in the present context?

A: Iran is a sovereign nation and makes its own analysis of the market, taking its decisions in a fully sovereign way. Iran's customers have been accustomed to pay more and, in another climate for international politics, there are probabilities that Iran's customers would have accepted the increase.

At present, I think everybody feels that oil prices are rising very fast. Everyone also knows that between January and the end of March there has been a fall in the price of refined products and demand fell. But from April onwards, demand has recovered, prices for refined products are looking up and, therefore, the price of crude oil ought to rise.

Q: What in your view is going to happen to oil prices?

A: In my view, the price of petroleum ought to rise.

Q: Will the increase be made in Algiers or at Taif?

A: I am not in a position to answer you.

Q: What about Algeria's prices?

A: Algeria is a member of OPEC and Algeria takes into consideration the state of the international market before deciding on the prices it asks from its customers.

Q: Will the Taif meeting decide on an increase in prices?

A: The meeting was called to examine the document drawn up by the Strategic Committee. That is the meeting's agenda.

Q: Will Algeria continue its policy of reducing output? Or will the country's need for revenues cause you to raise production levels?

A: This is a question that will be dealt with by the extraordinary Congress of the National Liberation Front (Algeria's ruling party) which is to be held this year. The meeting will take a decision on the new five-year plan, and future prospects for oil production is one of the elements that must figure in the plan because these prospects govern forecasts for revenues in foreign currency; as a consequence, it could be said that future production will govern to some degree the country's economic activity.

Q: Algeria and Venezuela have proposed that the OPEC Special Fund should be transformed into a development bank for the Third World with a capital of \$20 billion. Will this proposal take practical form?

A: This is a question that was broached at the Caracas ministerial meeting last December and the recommendations of this meeting were later examined by the Strategic Committee during its last meeting in London. The Strategic Committee has taken up the proposals and its recommendations are for an organisation with a very large capital. The size of this capital sum has not been fixed but the Algero-Venezuelan proposal has been mentioned and that would fix the capital at \$20 billion. The question will certainly be discussed by all of the members of OPEC at the Taif meeting.

Q: Are there not some countries in OPEC which feel that there is no need to transform the Special Fund into a development bank for the Third World and that all that is needed is to increase the capital of the Fund?

A: Those who say this are the countries which have not taken sufficiently consideration of what we have been told inside the Group of 77 (developing nations), inside the Organisation of African Unity and what we observed inside the non-aligned movement. I believe that those who hold this view (that the development bank is not necessary) do not take into consideration in a neutral fashion the points of view of the majority of the countries which would receive aid from the bank which we have proposed. They (opponents of the bank project) are certainly not faced with daily problems of the balance of payments to provide their countries with all sorts of commodities. These include energy, that is to say, crude oil or refined products.

But this is the reality in some developing countries. There are real problems of balances of payments in Third World countries and more and more costly energy is going to increase the dimensions of these problems. OPEC

must make its contribution towards resolving these problems. OPEC should not consider itself responsible for the economic conditions of the Third World, but it should never forget that OPEC countries are an integral part of the Third World regardless of the size of their revenues and that their fate is closely linked to that of the poor.

Q: Returning to the question of gas. Do you think that the Algero-American negotiations in Washington in May have a chance of succeeding?

A: Inshallah!

Difficult Talks With Us and France

Randa Takieddine writes from Algiers:

A delegation headed by the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the US Department of Energy, Leslie Goldman, visited Algeria last week for two days of negotiations with officials at the Algerian Ministry of Energy on new LNG prices.

Deliveries of Algerian LNG to the US company El Paso have been suspended since April 1 because of a dispute over prices and El Paso has forecast a shortfall of 3 billion cubic metres this year on contracted sales of 10 billion cubic metres. The company has attributed the shortfall to difficulties at the Arzew liquefaction plant in Algeria.

Algeria wants to raise gas prices to parity with crude oil, and the US government is involved in the talks because distribution of natural gas is a monopoly in the US; the rates charged are fixed by law and El Paso can therefore only pay approved prices to its suppliers.

According to well-informed US sources here, the US government cannot agree to pay Algeria \$6.00 per million BTUs when it is paying only \$3.63 to Mexico and \$4.47 to Canada for gas piped to the US borders.

The cost of delivery to the US of Algerian LNG would be about \$2.00 per million BTUs fob, the sources say, which would make the price to the customer about \$8.00

The Algerian Oil Minister however argues that natural gas prices since 1964 have been ridiculously low and that they should be linked to oil prices for that reason.

Both sides seem to have a lot in stake in trying to make the May 1 talks in Washington a success: these negotiations will be held at lower-than-ministerial level.

El Paso has already invested a great deal in the venture with Algeria, including nine tankers, each costing \$150 million, and two terminals costing between \$3 and \$5 million each. American officials argue that Algeria's will be the larger loss if the talks fail, and point out that El Paso supplies represent only 2 per cent of global energy consumption in the US. If Algerian LNG is not forthcoming, they say, domestic output can be increased, coal or oil consumption can be boosted or extra gas can be bought from Canada.

However, this seems to be optimistic. It would not be that easy to buy more gas from Canada and a switch to oil or coal would be costly.

As far as Algeria is concerned, the failure of the talks would mean the loss of an important short-term market, since only the US and Japan at present have the tankers to pick up the LNG. Officials stress however that the question of Algerian independence is important and say that they are prepared to see LNG exports halted if need be.

CSO: 4420

VARIOUS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL GROUPS DECLARE THEIR POSITIONS

Groups In Parade

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 31 Mar 1980 p 2

[Text] Late last night, various political and social groups announced in communiques that they will participate in the parade commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Women's Association published a communique concerning their participation in the ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In one portion of the communique it stated, "All of the patriotic women of Iran are invited to strengthen the solidarity of the people of Iran in the anti-Imperialist struggle by participating as broadly as possible on this day."

The Iranian Committee for the Defense of Afghanistan also announced in a communique that it will participate in the 12th of Farvardin [1 April] Parade.

The Central Office of the Coordinating Council of Tehran Mosques also announced their participation in the parade being held on the anniversary of the Republic. This council announced that a book display will be set up along the parade route.

The Moslem Women's Council of Khazaneh and the Towhidi Peyam Society announced in communiques their participation in the parade.

Likewise, a group of Moslem sisters from Qazvin Avenue, a group of Moslem sisters from Navab Safavi Avenue, and a group of Moslem sisters from Shir-o Khorshid and Imamzadeh Hassan Avenues also announce in communiques their participation in the parade.

The Islamic Revolution Foundation of Iran announced that it will participate in the 12th of Farvardin Parade. This foundation has called upon various groups of the population to participate in the parade in order to enhance the Islamic Republic's anniversary celebrations.

The Dawn of Hope Islamic Society, while commemorating the anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a communique, once again announced its support of the Islamic Republic regime under the leadership of Imam Khomeini and the President of the Republic, and pointed out that it will participate in the 12th of Farvardin Parade.

The Covenant Youth Council, a group of Moslem students from the Sepas Middle School, the Council of Moslem Students of Science and Industry, the 4th of Khordad / 25 May / Youth Council, the Council of Moslem Art Students from Art School Number 7, Moslem students from the Parisa Middle School (supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq of Iran), Moslem students from the Efdarisa Middle School (supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq), Moslem students from the Keyhan Now Middle School (supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq), the Moslem Students Council of the 'Asemi Middle School, the Vanak Moslem Youth Council, a group of Moslem art students and industrial students from the Iran Technical School, and the Khazaneh Moslem Youth Council announced in communiques their participation in the 12th of Farvardin Parade.

The Region 7 Spiritual Council

The Spiritual Council of Region 7, Tehran, also announced in a communique its participation in the parade commemorating the establishment of the Islamic Republic. This communique states:

"On the anniversary of the Islamic Republic, the brave nation, by this magnificent parade once again is severing the vital nerve of world-devouring Imperialism and through its liberating Revolution, is rushing to the aid of the weak of the world; therefore, the Spiritual Council of Region 7, Tehran, as an endorsement of the invitation of the President of the Republic, as always is calling upon everyone to participate in these historic ceremonies and place themselves at the forefront of this roaring flood in order to eradicate the agents of the East and the West."

Statement of the Iran Party

On the occasion of the anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iran Party published a statement and, while commemorating the first anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it called for the unity and solidarity of all of the national forces.

In a portion of this statement, it said:

"Fellow Countrymen,

"The enemies of the Revolution, the superpowers, at the head of whom are criminal America and aggressive Russia, have threatened our revolution with devious plans from every side. Their servants, the obsolete and prostituted scabs, the opportunists, the counter-revolutionaries, and the thieves, have all conspired with one another to strike a blow against the Revolution from within.

"There is only one way left to save the Revolution and to preserve the Republic and that is to have all free-thinking patriots, progressive and committed Moslems of Iran and democratic and anti-imperialist friends join together into a single, united, justice-seeking force to remove these fetters from the limbs of the young Republic and to prevent the pure blood of the idealistic martyrs of the Revolution from being shed in vain."

The Towhidi Basharat Club, a group of Moslem art students, and 140 of the committed doctors of Tehran, in order to celebrate the anniversary of the Islamic Republic and to announce support of the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, declared in a communique their readiness to participate in the Revolution's anniversary celebrations in response to the invitation of the President of the Republic.

On the whole, all of the groups have considered participation in this parade a step toward unifying the ranks of the people against imperialists and their agents and lackeys.

Student Warning Against Clashes

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 31 Mar 80 p 4

[Text] The Moslem Students' Association of the country's major universities mentioned in detailed statements the conspiratorial nature of the deposed Shah's presence in Egypt and gave emphatic warning about the unwholesome effects of the spread of the provocations and attacks aggravating the class, party, and group differences of opinion in the country's present circumstances, considering American Imperialism's conspiracies in the region.

In an open letter to Imam Khomeini, the Moslem Students' Association of Tehran University pointed out: "The disputes, which are deflecting the sharp edge of the attacks away from the principal enemy toward the revolutionary forces of Iran and show them worthy of any kind of adversary, are escalating to the point where, if these actions are not checked, the way will be paved for diversionary disputes and battles that will have no outcome except to reestablish Imperialism's domination of our country and people. The thing that we have learned and have learned well from our thoroughly painful history is that one cannot combat Imperialism and its cohorts and expect them to be annihilated when internal divisiveness and factionalism exist among the forces. The numerous intrigues that we witnessed on the eve of the elections to aggravate the disputes and to exacerbate the group and party differences concerning various election difficulties showed that these hostile and divisive inclinations are intensifying despite the fact that they harm the Revolution and the people and render useless the blood shed by the martyrs. It is the sum total of these anxieties that has made us determined to ask His Eminence the Imam, with all sincerity, to put an end to these anxieties through his guidance and counsel in order that the rights of the people might be defended under circumstances of peace and mutual under-

understanding and devoid of any kind of threat or backlash, and all of the forces can proceed to welcome the second phase of the elections."

In a letter to the Imam, the Moslem Students' Association of the Fine Arts University outlined the facts of Imperialism's conspiracies, and wrote:

"Esteemed Father,

"The Imperialists and their cohorts clearly have perceived that the People's Strugglers, the most genuine of the popular forces, are their greatest enemies, and they have realized that most of the blows inflicted upon them during the past year have come from these same Strugglers; therefore, by employing the Shah's methods, which have no objective but to pit the popular forces and various social levels against one another, they are trying to portray their enemies as the enemies of Islam and the people. These methods and practices, the very same kind that we see in the present situations and developments, no doubt are specific schemes for creating an uproar and for destroying the peaceful political atmosphere."

In an open letter to Imam Khomeini, the Moslem Students' Association of the Science and Industry University stated:

"Dear Father,

"Your children, the youth and students of this country who risked their lives for the anti-Imperialist Revolution, are ready for every kind of sacrifice in the struggle against American Imperialism, which Your Eminence repeatedly, and justly, has called the major enemy and great devil of the Age. They impatiently request Your Eminence's instructions and guidance concerning ways to check the ever increasing national, racial, religious, and class discords, divisions and bellicosity, especially during these days when we are going through the interval between the two stages of the elections and the Imperialists and their aides are seeking to take advantage of, and to exploit, this ground for creating and aggravating as much as possible the differences of opinion among the various classes of the people."

Likewise, in a letter to Imam Khomeini, the Moslem Students' Association of the National University wrote: "At the time of the dictatorship and the domination of Imperialism, those people who sat on the sidelines when it was time to take up arms and to fight for the exaltation of Islam, now that domestic belligerence is desired by the Imperialists, contrary to your guidance, see the solution in pointing their weapons at the hearts of the anti-Imperialist revolutionaries! Dear Father, as you know, if such inclinations are not checked, the dire consequences of fighting and contention will pave the way more than ever for the evil goals of the Imperialists, who have no objective except the annihilation of Islam and the weak nations of the world and who therefore are trying to make Iran a second Lebanon, because they are well aware that, if Civil War and fratricide occur, there will never be another opportunity to launch Revolutionary Islam and to return the deprived to their lost rights."

The Moslem Students' Association of the Teacher Training University, in a statement entitled, "With Revolutionary Vigilance, We Will Nip in the Bud the Ruinous and Divisive Intrigues of Imperialism," wrote: Doesn't aggravating the internal fighting by stirring up the religious feelings and motives of the people and viciously ascribing various types of insults and malicious accusations to the Strugglers and militants play precisely into the hands of America's anti-popular desires?"

The Moslem Students' Association of the Labor University also wrote in a letter to Imam Khomeini, "Unfortunately, as regards such disruptive actions, we are encountering positions that clearly declare that there is no alternative but to 'think of weapons' in countering the People's Strugglers, these true children of Islam and the people."

The Moslem Students' Association of the Political and Social Sciences College stated in a letter: "The forces that view the permanence of the Revolution as inconsistent with their interests and see their death in that have begun to struggle, and, by aggravating the disputes and the disruptions and by fomenting fighting, they are trying to pit the forces against one another and to destroy the basis for mutual understanding and unity which is so necessary on the eve of the second stage of the parliamentary elections, and, in this way, to preserve the interests of their masters."

Likewise, the Moslem Students' Association of the banking sciences, the coordinating office of the Moslem Students of the Social Services College, the coordinating office of the Moslem Students of Danavand College, the coordinating office of the Moslem Students of the Tehran Insurance College, and the Moslem Students' Association of Tehran Technical College, in letters to Imam Khomeini, while describing the conspiratorial circumstances of the disturbances and divisiveness created among the people and political groups and citing Civil War as the objective, asked Imam Khomeini to prevent the disputes and disturbances from escalating in order that the second phase of the elections might be held in peace.

Mojahedin Disarming

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 Mar 80 p 12

[Text] The People's Strugglers [Mojahedin-e Khaleq] Organization of Iran announced in a letter to Dr Bani Sadr, President of the Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, that all branches of the People's Strugglers throughout the country will be declared disarmed. This organization has announced the reason for such a declaration to be the neutralization of armed counter-revolutionary threats. We read in this letter:

"Dr Bani Sadr, President of the Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council,

"According to reliable information that we have received, organized, widespread conspiracies are underway throughout the country against the People's

Strugglers of Iran, and they are appearing one by one. The extremely sensitive political conditions of the country during these days, both as regards international developments and the arrival of the treacherous Shah in Egypt and as regards the parliamentary elections within the country and, right now, we are going through the interval between the first and second stages of those elections, require that your attention be drawn to the points below and that you be asked to exercise to the limit your legal responsibility and decision-making power as President of the Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Obviously, it is only in this way that one can guarantee the country's political tranquillity and internal mutual understanding; discourage any kind of international abuses, such as the behavior of the Ba'ath leaders toward Iran; and prevent anyone from fishing in troubled waters.

"1-The attack and assault against us and our supporters, and actions, such as the burning of books and leaflets in various parts of the country, have continued unabated and our applications to the responsible authorities concerning the convening of an open court to conduct legal investigations so far have remained fruitless. Likewise, your own recommendations and orders of last month regarding the exercise of power and decisiveness vis-a-vis the club-wielders and their instigators have not been obeyed.

"2-The market for obscure rumors about this and that is so brisk that, under conditions where the files and lists of SAVAK have not been published, they are making the most genuine revolutionary children of this country the target, instead of the opportunists and the praisers of the Shah.

"3-They raised obscure complaints to counter our election complaints and to denigrate them. Of course, they raised these complaints after learning about the complaints lodged by the People's Strugglers Organization of Iran in order that the masses of the people might remain ignorant and confused and, in the midst of this, in order that the enormous, basic frauds might be concealed or portrayed as insignificant. Now, you are well aware that the People's Strugglers did not possess any kind of executive responsibility during the elections, except for a few observers, many of whom were expelled from the precincts with beatings and insults during the early hours of the polling.

"4-Apart from the injurious party and group disputes and divisions, they are intensifying their incitements against the People's Strugglers and, for the most part, the question of the elections is probably their chief source for these incitements.

"5-Radio and Television have been playing a very dangerous game by inciting the uninformed masses, particularly under such sensitive conditions, and they are still continuing to spread poison against us, heedless of all the dire social and political consequences.

"6-From the sum total of events and developments, it appears that specific hands are at work which through sedition; fomenting clashes, riots and dis-

turbances; and indulging in harsh actions and reactions, have darkened and dimmed the peaceful horizon of the country, and, by expanding the hostile atmosphere, they are achieving their goals.

"Now, while drawing attention to all of the above points and reemphasizing the urgency of a conclusive investigation into all of them, the People's Strugglers of Iran hereby inform the President of the Republic and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces personally that, to prevent any anti-popular, inflammatory conspiracy and to check any fighting, quarrels, and unjust bloodshed, for which the People's Strugglers later will be blamed in thoroughly false Radio and Television programs, we have declared all of our branches throughout the country disarmed, just as we did during the Presidential elections, and we are ready to welcome your representative at any time to visit and supervise this important affair without going through any of the legal formalities and processes.

"Meanwhile, here we ask all of our supporters throughout the country to be steadfast in their principles and to be stubborn in their Islamic and Revolutionary beliefs up to the verge of martyrdom so that the seditious and instigators will not find any pretext. In other words, to prove our sincerity and good will and to neutralize the pre-arranged, anti-popular conspiracies, even though we welcome an honorable death, we do not consider the staging of counterattacks advisable until further notice.

"No doubt, however, the President of the Republic knows that one cannot order anyone to dispense forever with his right to lawful and legal defense."

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IRAN

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Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 13, 6-13 Apr 80 p 8

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Supplement to "Moscow News" issue No. 13 (2897), 1980

CSO: 1812

FREIGHT TRAFFIC FROM USSR TO IRAN CONTINUES

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 20-27 Apr 80 p 9

[Article by Igor Troyanovsky]

[Text] The heavy refrigerator trucks slowly roll onto the bridge spanning the Astara River and, reaching the middle of it, cross the Soviet-Iranian border. Astara, a town in Azerbaijan, has become an important transit centre for haulage transport from Europe to Iran.

Cargo for Iran--butter, cheese, baby foods, construction materials, chemicals, paper, and other consumer goods--is pouring into the country from the FRG, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and other states.

This volume of freight traffic will dramatically increase in the very near future, for construction of one of the biggest transshipment bases in the USSR has been completed in Astara. A base of about the same capacity is now being built on the Iranian side.

Transit through the USSR acquires a vital importance for Iran due to Washington's threats to set up an economic blockade. Cargo is also carried on the railway that goes into Iran through the Azerbaijanian town of Dzhulfa.

In spite of the quite obvious attempts of certain quarters in the West to upset the USSR-Iran relations, trade and economic contacts between our two countries continue to develop. The USSR delivers to Iran the goods it needs and electric power. The hydropower project on the Araks River is run by both countries, as before, and joint work is now afoot on designing the Khudoferskiy hydropower project, as I was told by Dmitry Dubinin, project's chief engineer, at the Baku branch of the Gidroproekt Hydropower Design Institute.

The USSR strives to develop Soviet-Iranian relations on principles of good-neighbourliness and lends support to Iran in its struggle against foreign intervention and for genuine national independence.

This is a principled stand. Immediately after the 1979 October Revolution in Russia, the Soviet Government declared that it had scrapped the secret treaties on the partitioning of Persia and Turkey. Moscow repudiated the concessions and payments that were coming in from Iran. The first equal treaty in the relations between the neighbour states, which laid the foundations for mutually beneficial cooperation was signed in February 1921.

The entire atmosphere in Astara reveals the total lack of ground for the reports by certain mass media organs in the West about "tensions" on the Soviet-Iranian border. It is not possible to see anything that is not there, and I failed to see any sign of "tensions." Neither did I see any troops apart from the usual frontier guard units.

Life in the town is exactly as it should be in a district capital in Transcaucasia.

Every Friday, from the minaret of the Astara mosque, a muezzin traditionally calls on the believers to attend divine services.

Astara-Moscow

CSO: 1812

IMMINENT GOVERNMENT CRISIS ANTICIPATED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Apr 80 p 7

[Article: "The Prime Minister Has Lost Control Over the Coalition Members"]

[Text] The government will not fall because of the Jewish Quarter in Hebron, or of continued settlements. It will not fall because of a crisis in the autonomy talks, demonstrations of "Peace Now" or "The Editors" talk show on television. Even unemployment and inflation will not be the cause of its demise. If it does fall soon it will be because of the national health insurance bill which will be presented to the Knesset when it reconvenes early in May. This law will hamper Kupat Kholim and all parties whose members enjoy its services, including HaPo'el HaMizrakhi. The latter party is still the backbone of the NRP and LaMifneh, headed by Minister Yosef Burg and whose real leader is Refa'el Ben-Natan, the "strong man" of the faction in the party.

Knowledgeable sources, both in Likud and in NRP say that the national health insurance bill will hurt the power sources of LaMifneh, HaPo'el HaMizrakhi and those segments within the NRP--its vast majority--that are still attached to the Histadrut. This is also the source of what was referred to as "the traditional partnership" between the Labor Party and NRP, a partnership which is based on real and very vital interests. The basis for this partnership has yet to be dissolved. NRP found it possible to cooperate with Likud on the national level while continuing its cooperation with the Labor Party on the municipal level--city councils, local religious councils and the rabbinical institutions. Kupat Kholim and the withholding tax for it are the financial sources of the Histadrut parties--or so claim people in Likud. If it turns out in the course of the next session of the Knesset that the government intends to dry them out by a national health insurance act, the moment may come when NRP will decide to quit the government headed by Likud and renew its historical partnership with the Labor Party. The passing of the Chief Rabbinate Law was the first step in this direction.

Sources in Likud and NRP confirm that it was no accident that the NRP was willing to create a governmental crisis and to hold up the budget on the issue of Kupat Kholim withholding tax. A special coalition meeting had to

be convened where at least some of NRP's demands were accepted. Even Minister Zvulun Hammer, who is against leaving the government at this junction, agrees that there may not be any way out during the coming Knesset session. The month of May now seems to be the determining month, for this reason and others, which may become part of it.

When the prime minister returns from Washington it will become apparent whether, during May, the autonomy talks can continue without a crisis and without additional isolation and ostracism of Israel on the international arena. Defense Minister Weizman already announced that he would not sit idle if the peace treaty is in danger of a crisis or even deterioration and a standstill. Weizman is also impartial because of the prime minister's intention to head Likud in the upcoming elections. Weizman may consider keeping quiet in view of his weakening position in the government and the continued overruling of policies which he supports if he can at least hope that the waiting period is going to be short. But he can certainly not last for a few more years. Weizman's friends and foes think that for his own sake he should do all within his power to hasten a decision on the struggle against Begin and his replacement as prime minister, without moving the elections up.

Weizman is not the only one who is thinking in terms of forcing Begin to resign without moving the elections up. Of course most of the ministers understand it too, as well as most of Likud's and NRP's members of Knesset. In any event, they sense it, even if only unconsciously so, and they act accordingly. The revolt against Menahem Begin on the Hebron issue, which is approaching a farce in the Knesset foreign and defense committee, is the best example for that.

It is possible that Begin would rather have it that the decision on Hebron is postponed until he returns from Washington. The fact is that even those closest to him are divided on his real intention. No one knows what to do—should they push for a decision in the foreign and defense committee on the Democrats' appeal so that Begin could be extricated from this mess of settling in Hebron proper supposedly by a Knesset resolution?

Should committee members be replaced so as to ensure a positive vote which will approve the government resolution or should they not be replaced so the committee, with its present composition, will overrule the government on the Hebron issue or at least will postpone decision? The ineptness of the coalition on this issue reflects the confusion and the collapse of authority of Menahem Begin, who has ceased to be an effective prime minister. What will his image as prime minister be, etc...What will he look like as prime minister if he cannot ensure a coalitionary majority on an important issue such as this, which cause such a stormy negative international reaction? Can Begin have any pretences of being a prime minister on issues of security and defense if a resolution that he himself pushed on the Hebron issue cannot stand because of a protest by his own deputy, Prof Yadin? No one expects him to be prime minister when it comes to social and economic issues. How will he withstand the bitterness of Qiryat

Arba and the settlers of Judea and Samaria if he gives in on the Hebron issue? Even NRP will encounter greater difficulties and there will be more pressure on it to leave the coalition and move the elections up. It is very doubtful that NRP will participate in a coalition headed by Ezer Weisman. It is just as doubtful that Likud will agree to be part of a coalition headed by Yosef Burg, if Menahem Begin is forced to step down.

The contrast between these two scenarios, and others, holds back NRP's decision regarding the fate of the government. The Liberals, too, are still unable to reach a decision. They will hold their convention early in May and maybe after that they will be able to join other parties in deciding on the fate of the coalition.

As for the Democrats, it is possible that there the revolt will start from the grassroots. It may eventually sweep Yiga'el Yadin and Israel Katz. Then they, too, for lack of choice, will have to go along.

In this atmosphere of whispering and conspiracy behind the prime minister's back it is no wonder that even Minister Zvulun Hammer's resolution, which intends to strengthen the prime minister by forming a "kitchen," looks like an attempt at creating an additional alibi, in addition to leaving the government whether or not the "kitchen" is established, or even if it is and then falls shortly afterwards. Whether there is no "kitchen" or whether it "burns the food" it is doubtful that his government can finish its term.

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CSO: 4805

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION REVIEWED

Tel Aviv AL-HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 3 Apr 80 p 4

[Article: "World Peace Is in the Hands of the Super Powers"]

[Text] Objectively speaking, events in Afghanistan are drawing the United States and Iran close together, in spite of the serious crisis between the two over the continued holding of the hostages for over 130 days now, and in spite of the fact that the United States is condemned as an enemy and a devil.

Interestingly enough, the United States was for years considered Iran's ally against two hostile enemies--the USSR and Great Britain. In 1946, the United States used its nuclear monopoly and forced Stalin to withdraw his troops from Iranian Azerbaïdzhân. In 1951, the United States prevented Great Britain from using force over the nationalization of the oilfields by the Tehran government and their expropriation from British companies. True, in 1953 the United States interfered, for the first time, and rudely so, in Iran's internal affairs by aiding in the overthrow of Mosaddeq. But this overthrow was somewhat supported, covertly and overtly, by the Moslem hierarchy headed by the various religious teachers, or ayatollahs.

Even now, in view of the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, there are growing tendencies among various segments of the population--the bazaar merchants, the middle class and even some in the Moslem hierarchy--which maintain that Iran should become a neutral country, without identifying with either super power. They do not mean neutrality and non-alignment in the sense of Castro's Cuba or South Yemen, but more in its original sense, as exemplified by Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.

Clouds Over The Balkans

A high ranking East European official, who visited Vienna recently, told one of the Austrian ministers that the Soviets now feel strong, possibly too strong. "After Afghanistan," he said, "there is no assurance that sensibility of the Russian leaders will be stronger than their sense of adventurism...."

The Balkan states, which for centuries were the epitome of international feuds and intervention from the outside, are now deeply worried. The concern over a possible flare up of ancient national feuds, fired up from the outside by a deft hand, is casting a fearful shadow. Hungary has territorial claims over Romanian Transilvania; Bulgaria is eyeing Yugoslav Macedonia and Albania has plans for the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia, which is inhabited by Albanians. Even Turkey and Greece, both of which hold key positions in the area, are worried.

Needless to say, the mighty Soviet neighbor has its own claims, intended to increase supervision and obedience. Romania has been under pressure for years to abandon its independent foreign policy. This pressure has now worsened with increased world tension. Yugoslavia is a fair target to the Soviet press because Belgrade condemned the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan—obviously "according to directives from Imperialism and the Reactionaries...." Even Albania, which split from both China and the USSR, is worried. In spite of the vast ideological differences between the two, little Albania, with 2.8 million people, has just announced that it is determined to fight "side by side with Yugoslavia against the common enemy, just as we did in the past...." The Yugoslav paper BURRA was quick to praise this position as a "contribution to peace and security in the region."

All Balkan countries, learning their bitter lesson from the past, devote a substantial part of their resources to armaments and strengthening their military power. But whereas Hungary and Bulgaria are equipped with modern Soviet weaponry, including MIG-23 planes, the Romanians and Yugoslavs have old Russian equipment.

The interest these countries have in maintaining their national identity and political independence is an incentive toward hectic economic and military development, while willing to accept help from the outside, in this case—the United States.

No Risks—No Trouble

Everyone involved gained from detente although the motives varied. For the United States the international respite was the key to the establishment of orderly relations with the other super power. It also was the assurance against deterioration to an unpreventable confrontation. For West Germany detente meant a chance for reunification, establishing ties with Germans in Soviet Russia and other East European countries and expansion of trade and exports. For France detente meant an independent policy between the super powers without having to risk deciding in either direction, which would have been inevitable had there been a confrontation between the two giants. For the USSR it meant legitimization of the new borders as established in World War II and a chance to acquire modern technology and equality in nuclear armaments.

The invasion to Afghanistan, like previous invasions to South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, etc., has been a heavy burden. The danger line is beginning to be more obvious to both super powers. They are both charged with drawing the line so it does not get damaged in the storm. Both the United States and the USSR announced that SALT 2 cannot be given up, its importance is still valid, now as before, and perhaps even more so.

West European countries, more than anyone else, are aware of the Soviet efforts to separate them from the United States, with all the implications thereof. In this context a German reporter summed up Chancellor Schmidt's visit to the United States remarking:

"West Germany like all West European countries, is happy that America protects it, but Germans want neither the risks nor the trouble...."

Squaring the Circle

Sometimes it seems that American policy is like squaring the circle: How to lean on China to stem the Russians in Asia, and, at the same time, not alienate India and Vietnam and not bring about deterioration of relations with the USSR, which, after all, is the major partner in keeping peace and preventing total destruction.

In his last visit to Peking, Defense Secretary George Brown said that the United States and China would form a "global strategic system." This deepened concern in the Soviet Union. Recently, Brezhnev said that by providing China with weapons the United States will have to choose between it and the USSR as a partner for world affairs. India is worried even more than Russia, which has a Chinese phobia (the Chinese have a Russian phobia). India claims that the strengthening of Pakistan by the United States is a threat to Indian security, because Islamabad has been known to use American weapons against India. It has done so three times in the past 30 years.

Even united Vietnam is worried. It badly needs economic help. It needs it so badly that there may be a repeat performance of Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking which opened all doors. The overly friendly relations between the United States and China have their benefits—and their drawbacks. Squaring the circle? Not necessarily. But it is necessary to consider all factors which play on the changing arena. Setting limits on either side is an urgent need. On the one hand this means a controlled policy toward China so the United States does not get involved in the widening rift between the two sisters, which could be an involvement without recourse. China is worried about a Soviet attack. The Soviets are worried about Chinese over population which may cause them to push in Siberia and northern Russia—its vast, sparsely populated regions. But in order to meet its request to rejuvenate its army and re-equip it with modern weaponry, which may be a deterrent—if only a conventional one—against a Soviet attack, Peking needs \$60 billion!

It is doubtful that the United States is prepared for an undertaking on this enormous scale. India hints, again and again--it did so during the last visit of presidential envoy Clark Clifford--that it is not forsaking its neutral stand for love of Russia, but because of a mistaken unilateral policy of the United States, which refuses to give it economic assistance, refuses to supply it with weapons and continues the embargo on shipping armaments to New Delhi, which has been in effect since the 1971 Bangladesh war.

Thus both super powers need sensibility. After all, the world's fate is within their hands--for peace or for war!

8646

CSO: 4809

REPORTS FOR NATIONAL ACCORD URGED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Feb 80 pp 10-11

[Editorial by Ahmad Baha'-al-Din: "Any Solution in Lebanon Has to Begin With the Lebanese Themselves"]

[Text] The sound of cannons reaches our ears from behind the mountains which surround Beirut, and the sound of machine-gun fire is even closer to our ears, but you know neither the reason for it nor do you know what nearby street it is coming from. And if traffic gets thick and comes to a halt for a few moments, people jump out of their cars and try to find out why the traffic has stopped. [They want to know], is it merely confusion on the part of a traffic cop or is it "a small battle"? But since people have heard about the partial withdrawal of the Deterrent Forces—[and I mean] all the people, whether or not they are in favor of the Deterrent Forces or against them—they are pessimistic about this news, and they are afraid of what might happen without the Deterrent Forces. And the radio in the taxi-cab that I am riding in, in this heavy traffic, is talking about fighting between the Phalangists and the National Liberals in Jubail. And when I am talking with the taxi driver, and asking that God stop all of this, and that the Lebanon as we know it return to us, the old taxi driver replies to me by saying: "In the mountains we have a saying which says 'the vinegar worm is from it and in it.'"

When translated into city language this means that the problem of Lebanon is in the Lebanese. When a person is far from Beirut and is used to discussing the defects and causes [of the Lebanese problem] in its various broad frameworks, he finds himself discussing—and rightly so—the great issues which have led to the catastrophe and led to the fact that it persists: the collapse of the Arab governments, the fact that they are being torn apart, their use of the territory of Lebanon as an arena in which to pursue their policies, the Palestinian problem, Israeli aggression, and hidden foreign intervention.

But when a person goes to Lebanon itself, he is surprised by the capacity of the Lebanese to plunge into an analysis of matters from points of view which are very local, tribal, clan- and village-oriented, not to mention sectarian. [They say] that the battles in Jubail between the Maronites

are going on because the Phalangist leader Samir (J'j'), for example, was involved in a clash over a position occupied by the National Liberals, who were led by one of his cousins, but this cousin has been an enemy of his for such-and-such a length of time, and his name is such-and-such (J'j') also. And an accord is not feasible, because if it were, then such-and-such a person would have to meet with Shaykh so-and-so, and so on, and so forth.

And I, in particular, was among the first to make all of the other parties responsible rather than the Lebanese. But perhaps the time has come to apply some pressure on the Lebanese themselves. It is not true that they are just victims. And it is not true that they are incapable of doing anything in the face of great factors of the international conflict, whether it be the Arab conflict, or the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The thing that the taxi driver said about the "vinegar worm is from it and in it," if not entirely true, still there is some truth in it. And although any fair person would not demand that the Lebanese solve this catastrophic crisis, still they are certainly capable of putting the brakes on it. But after a few days in Beirut and in surrounding areas which I was able to get to, I [wish] to permit myself to be stern with the Lebanese because of my long-standing love [for Lebanon]. As far as I am concerned, Lebanon is a real second homeland for me, and it is a lung in my body which has become clogged and throbs with pain every hour. [And I wish to permit myself], after what I have seen and after having discussions on all levels with the Lebanese, to say what used to be said about the "Bourbons" when they returned to Paris after the French Revolution and said that "they had not forgotten anything and had not learned anything!" It is really strange that with the Lebanese leaders 5 years of civil war and domestic and foreign factors of change have not changed anything in their basic positions. Sometimes a person feels that all of them have only become more convinced of their same old convictions. It is as if the people fighting had dug trenches, and had also dug "mental and intellectual trenches," in which they barricaded themselves and from which they pelted one another. And they did not send any real messengers to any real dialogue, that is, to any new dialogue which is based on new realities.

I do not claim that I, or anybody else, is able to offer a solution in a capsule.

But is it not possible to talk about a "step" and after that another "step," and then the removal of a "mine," and after it there could be the removal of another "mine"?

It is true that the Palestinian problem will not be solved before the Middle East problem is solved. And it is true that the problem of Lebanon will not be solved until the problem of the Palestinians is solved. But this means that the opposite is [also] true, if only to a certain degree. If the Lebanese problem were to be solved and boiled down to a single

position, then it would be possible to create a better climate of mutual dealings in the Palestinian-Lebanese problem. And if it were possible to create an acceptable formula for the Lebanese and the Palestinians, then it would be possible to confront Israel more effectively. What I mean is, just as it is possible to begin with the larger [element], which is the international conflict, it is also possible to begin with the smaller [element], which is the Lebanese-Lebanese conflict. At least this is closer to what our capabilities are.

What I see simply is that nothing will happen before the beginning of the operation of "abridging" Lebanon's mosaic, tribal dictionary of vengeance.

As we know, in Lebanon there are sects and leaders in positions of power. But the war, instead of reducing the sects to a smaller number and reducing the number of leaders in each faction, increased their number like the spread of cancer, until the [sects and positions of leadership] became filled with what people call in their dictionary "shopkeepers"--that is, political "shopkeepers." Everybody began to "go into business for himself." It is enough for him to have "10 armed bullies" in order for him to have a voice. And this is happening in every group, among the Lebanese Christians, and among the Lebanese Moslems and the Palestinians.

For this reason there is no talk about a dialogue between these groups or those groups, because each faction has a thousand opinions represented in it. And if some of [these differences] are based on a difference in opinion, the rest of them are simply based on egotism.

[Take, for example], the Lebanese Front, that is, the Maronites. There you have the Phalangists and you have the National Liberals. And you have the Guardians of the Cedar Trees. You have Sulayman Franjiyah, and you have ('Hdn) and (Zghrta). And you have Raymond Iddih and the silent unarmed Maronites whom he represents.

What if there were one Maronite voice? It would necessarily have to be a balanced voice, which would not have all of these trends, but it would have something from each trend. And if the old leaders would forget their egotism, and their pride, and what they consider to be their privileges, they could subordinate themselves to one single Maronite representative--either a person or a formula--representing all of the Maronites. What right [of theirs] to weep about Lebanon, to tear each other to shreds, and [to have] their privileges is dearer to their hearts than anything [else]? What if they drew up a single formula with the Maronite Lebanese president, Ilyas Sarkis, and the Maronite leader of his army, Victor Thuri? President Sarkis is accused of being a Maronite before being a Lebanese. Would this not make his voice stronger? And with this step would they not have cleared a wide, clear path instead of having dozens of winding, long, narrow paths?

And as for the Sunni Moslems. And I would like to say all Moslems, Sunni and Shi'a.

All of them agree that Salim al-Huss has emerged as a statesman, as a nationalist, and as a balanced man of integrity. What if the Moslem leaders, including those who have enjoyed the privileges of leadership for 40 years as well as those who came upon the scene only 4 years ago, would be content to have Salim al-Huss as their current representative and as their new man? What if they supported him instead of [making things difficult] by wearing him out? And what if they forgave him his sin, the same sin that Sarkis has, of not being a member of the club of traditional leaders--with no traditional sources of power in terms of hereditary dominance in certain areas, loyal henchmen in certain areas, and the keys to election polls in certain areas, and other such matters which find their expression in a dictionary which has become worn out with time?

I do not [necessarily] mean Ilyas Sarkis in particular, nor Salim al-Huss in particular. But I am trying to suggest the idea of the "abridgement," whether by means of these two men or by means of others.

The same thing applies, to a certain degree, to the Palestinians who must have a single voice. And perhaps they are closer to doing this than other people are. And this applies to the Lebanese nationalist forces which, after the death of Kamal Jumblat, disintegrated into being dozens of organizations which are fighting each other just like people did in times of old--and in this realm they are not at all surpassing them. They say that Lebanon is the problem of the Palestinians. And in the case of the south some people are whispering around that the legitimate army did not go to the south of Lebanon because of the objections of the Palestinian Resistance. And the Palestinian Resistance says that it did not object to this, and that it welcomes the legitimate army [in the south]. Others say that the ones who are objecting are the joint Lebanese forces, and not the Palestinians. President Ilyas Sarkis fancies that he might be able to have a dialogue with the Palestinians, but he does not want to establish the principle of conducting a dialogue with representatives of the joint Lebanese forces and does not want to grant them the legality of entering into any future dialogue concerning the accord. That he refuses to do. Or [at least] the primary leaders, Maronite and Moslem, refuse to [allow] him [to do] this!

In Lebanon they are entering into a Byzantine-like dialogue: Does the solution to the Lebanese problem begin in the south, or does the solution to the Lebanese problem begin in Beirut? In my humble opinion, the problem of the south is perhaps more serious. But it is harder to solve, because it involves another party which we are still not able to challenge and to confront. And this is Israel.

But as for solving the problem of Beirut, that is, solving the Lebanese-Lebanese problem, and then the Lebanese-Palestinian problem, this is certainly easier because the elements are among us and within us. And solving this problem would completely change any orientation toward solving the problem of the south.

But we prefer Byzantine debates, because they postpone our having to deal with our practical tasks.

As a first step toward recovery, Lebanon needs to have an accord. This is something that nobody disagrees with. And to have an accord it is necessary to have a dialogue. And to have a dialogue it is necessary to have concessions. And it is necessary to abridge and reduce the number of factions and the number of issues.

It is impossible to have a dialogue between 100 people, but it is reasonable to have one between 3 or 7 people. And in order to have [a dialogue] between 3 or 7 people, it is necessary that they have a reasonable attitude, and it is necessary that they have authority.

But if Lebanon does not orient itself toward this abridgement, but instead remains oriented toward fragmentation—[with each group] having its own sect, its own movement, and its own trend—this means that Lebanon will leave its destinies up to the whim of the winds, and will let the reins of its steeds rush off to wherever they feel like. I constantly and always say that the world and the Arabs are to a large degree responsible [for this].

But the Lebanese are the ones who are primarily responsible for this.

And I am talking about "the Lebanon which belongs to all of us," as one of its natives, even though I do not carry its passport, and even though I do not belong to one of its sects. We are the ones who send it to the sep of our minds, and take from it fresh breezes for our lungs. We are not the ones who send weapons to Lebanon, and demand its blood and its martyrs.

9468

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SYRIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 16 Feb 80 pp 24-27

[Article by Beirut correspondent Chassean Bayram: "Probabilities of an Explosion Are Receding; Deterrent Forces Have Not Been Withdrawn and (Lebanese) Army Has Not Been Deployed in the Capital"]

[Text] The [Palestinian] Resistance opposed deployment of the [Lebanese] army, but did not favor the idea of taking its place.

The National Movement rejected deployment of the army "because it would break up if it were deployed."

The Arabs expect the causes of the problem to disappear when Lebanese-Syrian relations are put in order.

Ever since speculation began on the nature of future Lebanese-Syrian relations, there has been incessant talk behind the scenes about the necessity or probability of organizing these relations within a framework of bilateral agreements, especially with regard to security matters.

From the time President Ilyas Sarkis became president of the republic, a number of meetings have taken place between him and the Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad. These have generally been preceded or followed by discussions between officials of the two countries, at times at the level of prime minister, and at other times at the level of foreign ministers. Aside from that, delegates [from both sides] have been coming and going on the Damascus-Beirut road for over the last 3 years.

In all this time, Damascus has not once either said or broached the subject of what it expects from the Lebanese authorities in terms of security or other agreements.

It has been said many times that Damascus did not want to be the one to take the initiative in this domain, but wanted the initiative to come from Lebanon. Thus, Damascus would like to see the Lebanese president take up

the file of mutual relations with the Syrian president, and explore with him how far Lebanon can go in its relations with Syria and what points it cannot go beyond in this area.

Following the last meeting between the Lebanese and Syrian presidents in Damascus, one of the Syrian officials was asked:

"Before this meeting between the two presidents, al-Assad and Sarkis, a lot was said about the fact that the two presidents would embark on a discussion of the future of bilateral relations, and could look into drawing a framework for them that would include the conclusion of security, economic and other agreements. Has anything of this sort happened?"

The Syrian official answered: "I assure you that nothing of that sort has happened, and that the two presidents have discussed everything except the subject of these agreements which you have been talking about in Beirut. Neither has President al-Assad demanded anything, nor has President Sarkis shown or demonstrated any desire in this direction."

The Syrian official was asked: "Perhaps it would be better if Damascus took the initiative, and said in all frankness that the situation demands agreements such as these. This is based on the reality of the present circumstances and on the security role currently undertaken by Syria in Lebanon. This is a role difficult to do without within a year or two, because Lebanon will remain, for the foreseeable future, in need of this Syrian help until the Arab-Israeli conflict is settled. [A Syrian initiative] would also be based on the historic relationship between the two countries, and on the organic bonds which President al-Assad once referred to as he said: 'The security of Syria is the security of Lebanon, and vice versa.' But why did he leave matters hanging in the air, and why did he leave his convictions and desires suppressed in his heart?"

The Syrian official replied: "This is true. But in all sincerity, I will ask you this: 'Assuming that Syria wants to bind itself to Lebanon with agreements of this sort, on the basis of the reality of present circumstances and the distinctive nature of historic relations between the two countries, does the [domestic] situation in Lebanon, in general, and the situation of President Ilyas Sarkis, in particular, enable him to respond to the demands of Syria or to convert some of them into agreements?'"

The Syrian official continued: "The truth is that we do not want to complicate things for President Sarkis. We appreciate his circumstances and the circumstances of Lebanon, and we do not want to use our role and our security presence in Lebanon to compel him to make agreements of this sort. Before anything else, we want Lebanon to regain its health, and we want the situation of the legitimate authorities to be strengthened. They would then become capable of taking important decisions like the ones you are talking about. When that happens, we will be able to deal with matters as they come up."

Former president Sulayman Franjiyah tells of a similar dialogue between him and President al-Assad more than a year ago about Lebanese-Syrian relations and their future. Franjiyah at that time was still a member of the Lebanese Front which included him, former president Camille Shau'an and shaykh Pierre al-Junayyil.

Franjiyah says that president al-Assad said to him: "I want to be clear and understood by all Lebanese when I say that Syria is in no way disposed to attempt to impose any formula concerning future relations between it and Lebanon, be it with regard to security, political, or economic agreements."

President al-Assad directed the following question to Franjiyah: "How many parliamentary votes are required for modification of the Lebanese constitution?"

Franjiyah answered: "Two-thirds of the votes of the parliament."

President al-Assad thereupon said: "If any agreement between Lebanon and Syria were submitted to me at any time, I would not be prepared to sign it, unless I was sure that it had the support of a majority of 80 percent of the Lebanese people, not only two-thirds."

President al-Assad added: "What we want everybody to be clear about is that our primary concern is that Lebanon recuperate and regain its security and stability; that it preserve the unity of its territory and its people; and that the government regain its status as a government capable of dealing with its national and Arab responsibilities."

There are many examples of similar talks and dialogues on a number of occasions between high Syrian officials and either Lebanese officials or politicians concerning this subject. In none of them did it appear that Damascus was in a hurry to conclude security agreements with Lebanon. Because of this, many were surprised by recently circulated information that Syria wants to open the dossier of relations with Lebanon with a view to concluding agreements that would organize their relationships. The information in question followed recent decisions to withdraw the Syrian Deterrent Troops from Beirut, Beirut suburbs, and the south.

This raises the following questions: Does Damascus feel that the legal authorities in Lebanon have become capable of making decisions as big as concluding agreements and treaties? Or is Damascus demonstrating, in one fashion or another, its desire to enter into discussions to conclude a particular treaty or treaties with Lebanon, but has sensed that President Ilyas Sarkis is not moving in this direction?

During the last few days, many politicians raised questions such as these after the problem of withdrawal of the Deterrent Forces from Beirut and other areas exploded on the scene. This led to such a dangerous deterioration in Lebanese-Syrian relations that the specter of a renewal of

hostilities reappeared on the Lebanese arena, especially after the Lebanese cabinet decided to deploy the [Lebanese] army to fill security gaps that would arise from the withdrawal of the Deterrent Forces.

The answer to such questions was a denial on the part of state of the existence of any knowledge that Damascus wants to conclude any such treaties.

And the high Lebanese official said: "It could be, that between us and Syria, there is very little coordination, or no coordination at all, in our domestic and foreign policies. And perhaps Syria reproaches us for that. However, Damascus has never made us feel, even once, that it has a desire to conclude agreements such as this."

And the Lebanese official asked: "I do not know if it is only this reproach which is the reason for initiatives on the part of Damascus to withdraw and regroup its Deterrent Forces in the Lebanese arena."

An answer to this question has been undertaken by some of the political personalities who have recently come to Damascus for the purpose of consultations concerning recent developments.

One of these political personalities said: "It is not only a question of reproach because of little coordination or complete lack of coordination. There are also many reasons, perhaps one of them being the fact that Damascus feels that the Lebanese authorities deal with them as they would deal with any other government, and that the Lebanese authorities do not implement any agreement concerning any of the matters upon which agreement was reached. In fact, they do implement some things whereas what was agreed upon was something else. This is in addition to the fact that the Syrian capital feels that official Lebanon has acquired a political orientation which differs from the orientation of Syria and which often contradicts it."

And this Lebanese political personality, after his return from Damascus after a meeting with Hafiz al-Assad and Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, told the following: "It was said to me in Damascus that, a while ago, Syria was visited by the prime minister of a small country which is barely known and which is located in the middle of an island in the Caribbean Sea. And it was clear to us that Syria's relations with this small country which is far away are far better than its relations with Lebanon."

And the representative of the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Mr Hamadi al-Said, returned from a visit to Damascus and in one of his private meetings he said that the Syrian officials complain a lot about the lack of existence of any supports or bases which would regulate or consolidate relations with Lebanon, and that the Syrian capital has come to be inclined toward treating the subject of the extension of the service of the Arab Deterrent Forces, which are operating in Lebanon, [as something to be achieved] by means of a bilateral agreement between it and Lebanon, with no need to coordinate with the Arab League.

Mr Hamadi Al-Said said that this conviction has been gaining more and more ground with Syrian officials after the manner and circumstances which followed and accompanied the subject of the recent renewal of the services of the Deterrent Forces which was ratified by the Council of the Arab League. And he added: "It appears that this manner and these circumstances have created, among Syrian officials, a feeling of annoyance and disgust. For example, Saudi Arabia is maintaining the extension for 6 months, and its delegate in the Council of the Arab League hinted that this extension maybe will be the last one. And Kuwait, in the way that Kuwaitis do things, agreed to maintaining [the extension] after setting conditions of a material nature. Libya refused to renew [its support of] the Deterrent Forces, and Algeria refused to participate in discussing the subject, and South Yemen--agreed to it after its delegate made a speech in which he condemned the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon."

The representative of the Arab League continued, saying: "This situation has made Damascus consider the necessity of creating a substitute formula so that it will not end up exposed to any Arab fleecing and so that this would not constantly be the cause of worsening its relations with the other Arab countries."

If these are the reasons which are talked about so much among Lebanese political circles, then this means forgetting about all the other remarks that have been made about the existence of something that is far more important than these reasons, and consequently [forgetting about] everything that has been said in the way of conjectures about the existence of lost links in the chain of these rapid, dramatic developments which have, in only hours, changed the entire Lebanese situation from being a situation of peace and security to being a situation of disruptions in security which are expected to renew a resumption of hostilities in the Lebanese arena.

And, also, if these are the reasons, then it is easy to explain the motives behind the decisions to withdraw. And consequently it becomes very easy to learn the reasons which led the legitimate Lebanese authorities to ignore all of the circumstances and complications and to take the decision to deploy the Lebanese army as a substitute for the Syrian Deterrent Forces.

Before the decision to deploy the army came out, many inquiries circulated concerning whether or not Lebanon would go to the House of the Master or whether it would be capable of staging a mutiny and answering the challenge.

In the cabinet session during which the decision was made to deploy the army, certain considerations were circulated around and they were considered to be the criterion:

1. Taking the decision to deploy the army and to use it as a substitute for the Deterrent Forces will not create a situation which is worse than the situation which might arise if the army were not deployed.

2. Not taking the decision to deploy the army means dividing Lebanon indefinitely and means the collapse of the [Lebanese] legitimate authorities. And this is one of Israel's basic strategic aims. For this reason it is necessary to carry out a screening operation which would show who supports a single Lebanon, united in terms of territory and people, and who supports Israel, whether or not he is aware of it.

3. Not deploying the army and not demonstrating the capability of the legitimate authorities to take matters into their own hands perhaps would create a condition of frustration and disappointment on the part of the countries who contribute the International Emergency Forces which are in southern Lebanon, and this would cause them, one after the other, to start withdrawing their forces and then the south would become a public domain which would belong to Israel.

4. Not deploying the Lebanese army as a legitimate authority to keep order in place of the Deterrent Forces would lead to one of two things:

Either it would lead toward a resumption of hostilities and no one is able to predict in which direction that situation would develop.

Or it would lead to the establishment of two or more authorities on Lebanese territory, one of which would be Palestinian in the Moslem area, and the second of which would be Phalangist in the Christian areas. Then Israel would have more than one pretext to say that its security has become threatened and to embark upon occupying the south, or perhaps to occupy the areas in which the UN forces are stationed. This would lead to the expansion and legitimacy of the petty state of Sa'd Haddad (and this is what is meant by the security belt that Israel wants) on the one hand, and on the other hand it would lead toward the Palestinians withdrawing into the interior of the country and thus creating, with time, a de facto situation which would result in a policy of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon.

5. In order to avoid all of these perilous dangers it is necessary to deploy the army and to adopt a firm policy which would be based on opening up two parallel lines [of communication] which would lead toward constant consultation and coordination both with Syria and with the Palestinian Resistance at the same time about the various general issues which concern the situation of the area and the actions and concepts which occur on the international level.

In practice, and according to the logical sequence of matters, the regime has no choice but to take the decision to deploy the army. Nevertheless, many people describe this as a brave decision, in view of the dangers entailed, and even of the risk entailed. The basis of this feeling is the predominate belief that, by means of this decision, the regime is playing its last card, in view of all that this decision entails in the way of challenges and all of the spirit of desperation that is included

in it--a desperation which says "I am drowning, so why should I be afraid of getting wet?"

The decision was made in the circumstances of the absence of three basic supports, at least one of which it was necessary to have be present in order that the decision find its way toward being implemented with a minimum of losses. These [negative factors] are:

The lack of a Lebanese-Syrian agreement.

The lack of a Lebanese-Palestinian agreement.

The lack of a Lebanese-Lebanese agreement.

One of the basic factors which the government found support in when taking the decision to deploy the army was the receptivity of Lebanese public opinion to this step and its refusal to let any other authority assume the task of filling the security gaps which would be caused by the withdrawal of the Deterrent Forces. Perhaps this is one of the most important practical reasons which have made the Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement, from the beginning, maintain the principle that their forces should take over the positions and should be the substitute for the Deterrent Forces.

And due to the absence of these three basic factors the decision to deploy the army was confronted by political and security attitudes which considered its implementation to be a prelude to the outbreak of a new war in the Lebanese arena, perhaps one aim of which would be an attempt to fragment the new Lebanese army for the purposes of returning the legitimate authority back to zero.

Above all, Damascus received this Lebanese decision with a great deal of annoyance and resentment after it had been interpreted as though the Lebanese authorities had disregarded all of the short-range and long-range reasons and circumstances which had led to taking the decision to withdraw the Deterrent Forces. Consequently the impression arose that the Lebanese authorities had decided to throw all of these reasons overboard and turn their back on Damascus as if nothing had happened.

In spite of this the Syrian attitude continued to adhere to the basics. Statements made by President Hafez al-Assad assured that the Deterrent Forces would not abandon their basic role in Lebanon, and that Syria maintains its position of combatting partition [of Lebanon] and maintaining the security of Lebanon as well as its unity in territory and population.

But there are indicators which have demonstrated the depth of the gap in Lebanese-Syrian relations, and consequently the depth of the damage which has afflicted these relations. [This could be seen] when the Syrian capital decided not to hand over the positions, from which the Deterrent Forces were going to withdraw, to the legitimate Lebanese authorities

before this is preceded by an agreement on the part of the "National Movement" which is allied with the Palestinian Resistance.

What about the attitude of the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement?

There is no doubt that the decision to deploy the [Lebanese] army has confronted the [Palestinian] Resistance and the "National Movement" with two very bad choices, which are: Either the army is deployed to take over the positions [vacated by] the Deterrent Forces, and this is something which is rejected both in form and in substance, or they will both take over these positions, and this is also something which is unpopular, if not downright unacceptable in principle. Why do the Palestinians reject this?

The head of the Palestinian Resistance Organization, Mr Yasir 'Arafat, was still on a visit to Saudi Arabia when the Syrians decided on the withdrawal from Beirut, the capital, and from its suburbs.

Abu 'Ammar's comment was that this development would place new burdens on the Palestinian Resistance because there would take place a revision in how it is deployed. These words contain the prior assumption that the Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement will occupy the positions which are vacated by the withdrawal of the Deterrent Forces in case of the insistence of the Deterrent Forces on withdrawing, and that it is totally unacceptable for the Lebanese army to take over these positions, or at least these positions should not be handed over to the Lebanese authorities.

Later on it was confirmed that this is not so much an assumption as it is an expression of the basic attitude of the leadership of the Palestinian Resistance.

And during the long day and night meetings which the Palestinian leadership held, sometimes with the participation of the National Movement, and sometimes without it, one basic question was always brought up, which was: If deployment of the Lebanese army is rejected, does this mean that it is acceptable for the Palestinian Resistance to deploy [its forces] to be a substitute for the Deterrent Forces in the capital and along the front-line positions?

The answer was that both things are rejected in principle if the choice were left up to the [Palestinian] Resistance. But what can one do when the developments, which are moving at such a rapid pace, have made the Palestinian Resistance choose between what is bad and what is worse? [Of course they would] make the first choice if circumstances demanded this.

After the Two-Year War there were actions and attempts in the direction of evaluating the positions of the Palestinian Resistance Organization, and

it underwent some self-criticism. What was said then was that the Palestinian Resistance, or at least the majority of its leaders, came out with one conclusion. This was that it had made a big mistake when it allowed itself to be involved in the Lebanese war, and that it had made an even bigger mistake when it decided to clash with Syria when it took the initiative to militarily intervene to stop the Lebanese war.

And if developments have once again confronted the Palestinian Resistance with the same choices, more or less, with [only] a difference in objective conditions, then this means that, above all, at the present time it is not allowed to worsen its relations with Damascus, no matter what the circumstances and the accompanying phenomena are. [The reason is that they are] strategic relationships characterized by confrontation with Israel and the "Camp David policy." Abu 'Ammar says that coordination between Syria and the [Palestinian] Resistance has already reached its highest and most advanced stage.

But, on the other hand, it also wants to avoid taking over the positions of the Deterrent Forces in the capital and on the front-line positions. There are a number of reasons for this, some of the most important of which are:

1. To avoid returning to the front-line positions for fear of being again involved in a new Lebanese-Palestinian war. And it does not consider that it has any interest in resuming hostilities with any Lebanese group.
2. To [avoid having] the Palestinian Resistance become a substitute for the Deterrent Forces, because this would make it necessary for it to withdraw groups of its men and forces, which are in the south of Lebanon, and [send them] to the capital, at a time when the [Palestinian] Resistance needs reinforcements there in order to deal with the probabilities of Israel undertaking military action in the south or using it as a corridor.
3. The problem of deploying the [Palestinian] Resistance, together with the National Movement, in place of the Deterrent Forces in the capital and its suburbs would mean, above all, an increase in daily friction with the people and all that this might cause in the way of alienation and hatred, and having to put up with daily excesses and abuses that might happen.
4. The fear of unaccounted-for surprises which might return the scenario to what it was during the Two-Year War.

As a result of discussions and consultations which have taken place, the Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement have agreed on a united position with which to confront these developments, and which is based on:

1. Undertaking efforts to convince Syrian officials not to carry out the decision to withdraw the Deterrent Forces and to bring back the situation to what it used to be.

2. In case Syria insists on its position and considers the decision to withdraw [the Deterrent Forces] as a final decision, then [the Palestinian Resistance and the National Movement] would demand that the Lebanese government utilize its internal security forces instead of the army, because this would guarantee the continuation of legality on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it would eliminate the danger of the presence of the army for the foreseeable future. The National Movement has undertaken to inform the government of this position through consultations and contacts which have been taking place between it and the head of the government, Dr Salim al-Hiss.

Although the stated position of the National Movement has been justifying its opposition to the deployment of the [Lebanese] army by saying that [the army] is nationally unbalanced, nevertheless the basic justifications which it has given to the government were based on fears of a resumption of hostilities in case the army is deployed and on the probability of wasting the army, because a number of parties are planning for this possibility.

The National Movement made an appeal to leave the army aside and to spare it any blow which could result in wasting it again. Then it made an appeal in the direction of bringing up the question of a political solution which could achieve a national accord.

The National Movement presented to the government, through Salim al-Hiss, a memorandum which includes its concept of how to deal with these recent developments and how to work toward overcoming them by relying on the following principles:

1. Keeping the Deterrent Forces as a united security force for all of the Lebanese.
2. Maintaining the unity of Lebanon, its Arabness, and its democratic development as a fundamental basis for any political solution which the state would undertake to suggest.
3. Defining relations with the Palestinian Resistance according to agreements that have been made, and putting relations with Syria in order.

And the National Movement has considered that opening the dossier of Lebanese relations with the Palestinians and the Syrians right now would be very useful when suggesting a political solution which would achieve a Lebanese accord. And in the midst of all of this the thing that really attracted attention was silence on the part of the Arabs who have been as silent as the "Sphinx" in the face of the developments which have rapidly taken place in the Lebanese arena, (and have taken place) in a baffling way because of most of the attitudes [taken] which could be described as convulsions, and due to the atmosphere that was loaded with all of the factors of an explosion. There did not loom on the horizon any Arab plan for mediation or any Arab initiative to stop this deterioration which has

afflicted Lebanese-Syrian relations and to prevent matters from reaching the point of an explosion, the specter of which hovered around for several days.

It was said in Arab diplomatic circles in Beirut that there was a justification for this silence. The Arab capitals feel that there is no reason to be greatly alarmed, and that no matter how aggravated matters become, they, in the end, will not lead to the occurrence of any events which would be as bad as people think.

Some of the Arab capitals, which are in a position to play an indicative and effective role, in their concept of things, merely believe that what is taking place is nothing more than attempts to apply pressure, a tug of war, and snapping at each other. As far as they are concerned matters are quite clear, and the dangers are also clear. And when everything is clear like this it is possible to anticipate happenings at the appropriate time, and dangers can [only] threaten everyone if new surprise developments, which nobody has counted on, take place.

In addition to this, these Arab capitals have not sensed, through their ambassadors in Beirut and Damascus, any encouragement to undertake a role of mediation. This has aroused the fear that any such Arab role would lead toward aggravation of matters and toward the creation of interpretations which would not be in the interests of bilateral Lebanese-Syrian relations. In fact most of these Arab capitals consider that these developments, which exploded all of a sudden, are a favorable indication, because actually they brought out what was buried in people's hearts, and made the parties concerned express what was in their hearts. And this is a good way of making matters more clear and definite.

After the head of the Lebanese parliament, Kamil al-As'ad, returned from his visit to Damascus last Saturday, matters had begun to crystallize more and more and a number of observers began to see the soundness of these Arab views. The talks which al-As'ad had conducted in Damascus ended up with positive results, as he asserted, since after them matters began to take another turn and became oriented toward dispersing the thick clouds which had gathered in the Lebanese skies. And this encouraged the opening of the doors of a dialogue between Beirut and Damascus in preparation for meetings between the two countries on various levels, and in particular, on the summit level, in order to enter into discussions which would deal in depth with Lebanese-Syrian relations.

The implementation of the decision which the [Lebanese] government made to use the Lebanese army was not subject to a definite time-table, but rather was subject to the withdrawal of the Deterrent Forces so that [the army] would be the substitute for them. So on this basis the decision to deploy the army will not be implemented until the withdrawal [of the Deterrent Forces] is implemented. And it appears that it will not be implemented, and if it is implemented, then [this will happen] only after an understanding concerning a joint Lebanese-Syrian plan.

QADHDHAFI'S SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST MOVEMENTS EXPOSED

Cairo **AKHIR SA'AH** in Arabic 12 Mar 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Muhammad Wajdi Qandil: "Serious Information About Sabotage Camps in Libya; Qadhdhafi Uncovers Soviet Plot Against Him!"]

[Text] The last thing that Colonel Qadhdhafi expected to happen was this dangerous move by the Soviet Union!

The last thing that the "unique" ruler of Libya imagined was that Moscow would dare to plot against him and plan for the overthrow of his anarchic and destructive regime and its replacement with a regime absolutely loyal to the Soviet Union.

The last conclusion reached by his malicious thinking and his limited intellect was that the Russians had become devoted allies dedicated to his survival. He fancied that he had bought them with the billions of dollars he had paid for the stockpiles of Soviet weapons stored in Libya. He imagined that he had checked their ambitions by his enthusiastic acceptance of their plans and his blind execution of their requests without concern for the dangers into which he was walking.

However, the likes of Colonel Qadhdhafi do not realize the extent of the danger until after they have fallen into its clutches. And this is exactly what has happened to Qadhdhafi recently. Qadhdhafi discovered--inadvertently--that the Russians were plotting against him. He found that there was a dangerous plan to organize a coup against him and topple his regime, and that the Soviets had a secret hand in this affair. If Qadhdhafi had not received a message through a European state warning him of the danger, he would have wound up in the claws of the Russian bear, and the same thing that occurred in Afghanistan would have happened in Libya. The colonel awoke from his crazy dreams to a bitter reality, and he exploded with rage and anger.

Eyewitnesses close to Qadhdhafi tell of his terrible shock when he discovered the Soviet plot.

Qadhafi shouted in great agitation: "They have deceived me. They have tried to toy with me so they could get rid of me at a suitable time. I did not think that they were such traitors and swindlers. I did not realize what lay behind their compliance with all my requests for Soviet arms!"

This arsenal of advanced weapons was not for Libya's benefit, then, but solely for the benefit of the Soviets. And in the meantime, they had collected more than \$12 billion--the equivalent of Libya's national income--which Qadhafi paid to Moscow from oil funds in a single year!

After uncovering the plot, Qadhafi contacted Moscow and demanded the immediate dismissal of certain Soviet advisers. Failing this, he threatened to expel them publicly after proving that they had played a part in the conspiracy rings.

When Brezhnev learned of Qadhafi's threat, he was afraid of the consequences of not complying with his demand, because Qadhafi does not judge things sanely and could have caused a damaging scandal for them under the critical circumstances which have prevailed since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, a group of the Soviet experts and advisers scattered throughout Libya was withdrawn in order to soothe Qadhafi's anger and capricious madness!

Actually, the "colonel's" problem is that he, like most Arab rulers both in the rejectionist states and in the oil-producing states, is unable to see beyond the end of his own nose and does not possess the ability to fathom civilized political thinking and the operation of international variables.

In the words of one Libyan nationalist who recently got out of Tripoli: "Qadhafi imagines that he is capable of playing the game of the 'grown-ups' but with the mentality of a child. For this reason, he has fallen into the Soviet trap. He yielded to the deceiving mirage of fantasy which rules his decisions and actions and imagined that with the Soviet arms deals he had become the 'leader of the Arab world.'"

This psychological complex reached the point that Qadhafi printed thousands of copies of his "Green Book"--which contains his naive ideas and the latest of his inventions, the "third theory"--and distributed it by order to school students, workers, and foreign guests visiting Libya.

He told his aides: "This theory is the protective armor against communism and a reply to the theory of Karl Marx!"

Thus the colonel imagined, and thus he erred in his assessment as always.

In his sick imagination, he believed that he was tricking the Russians, while in fact Moscow was scoffing at him.

The outcome was that he inadvertently discovered the plot against him--through another state--and uncovered the Soviet Union's involvement in hatching the plot.

Ruling circles in Libya are remaining silent about this plot and its details now that it has come to light that the Soviets had a hand in it.

However, the facts leaked out from persons close to the colonel. These facts indicate that a big European state informed Qadhafi of the plot and at the same time warned him about the Soviet experts present in Libya in light of information received by the state's intelligence organizations concerning the secret and suspicious activities of these experts and their covert contacts within the Libyan Army.

The Libyan colonel immediately contacted Moscow and confronted the Russians with the serious information exposing the method of the Soviet treachery. He threatened to expel groups of the Soviet and Cuban experts and advisers from Libya. Qadhafi told some individuals who met with him recently:

"President Sadat was right in what he did with the Soviets. So I'm thinking about expelling them the way Egypt got rid of them!"

This fickle disposition is nothing strange for Qadhafi. He may actually expel the Soviet experts now that the true nature of their mission has been revealed to him. On the other hand, he may keep quiet to hide the scandal and treachery and continue down the path of illusions behind the red mirage until he falls into the trap and the claws of the Russian bear close over all of Libya. Or he could...

But why did the Soviets act in this manner with the colonel? And why did they show their cards so hastily?

Perhaps Qadhafi's role--for them--has ended at this point, and they must look for a substitute totally loyal to Moscow. Perhaps Moscow has discovered that Qadhafi has become a "source of difficulties" through his reckless actions and his futile sabotage plots against neighboring states, such that he no longer conforms to Moscow's plans in the region.

In any case, the results are the same: More and more problems are piling up in Libya. Anarchy is taking up permanent residence in the economy and the various facilities. The Libyan Army is facing a grave crisis in training and an inability to absorb Soviet weapons. Most of the modern weapons and equipment is piled up in warehouses and camps and is not operated due to the lack of capable and trained Libyans to provide the technical expertise.

For this reason, Qadhafi resorted to contracting with 5,000 "North" Vietnamese military technicians for the maintenance and operation of Soviet-made air defense systems after discovering that only 20 percent of the systems spread out along the Libyan border are presently operating and the remainder are idle. With the passage of time, billions of dollars will be transformed into rust-covered equipment.

A special report on the weapons obtained by Qadhafi says that he has been able to supply himself with an awesome arsenal of stockpiled weaponry by virtue of billions of dollars worth of Libyan oil. He has 178 fighter planes of the Mirage, MiG-23 and the advanced MiG-25 types. He recently obtained the latter. He has 2,000 Soviet-made T-45 and T-62 heavy tanks and thousands of guns and missiles, including 150 155-mm guns placed on the Libyan-Egyptian border. Within a year, he will have 400 fighter planes and 10,000 Soviet tanks. In 1978 alone, he allocated approximately \$12 billion, or nearly all of Libya's oil income, for his arms purchases from the Soviet Union.

However, the fact is that he has only 20 trained Libyan pilots and crews for only 100 tanks. As for the advanced missiles, only the Soviet advisers and experts know how to operate them. Qadhafi's small army consists of just 25,000 men half of whom are illiterate Bedouins who can only use an insignificant percentage of these modern Soviet weapons.

There is a prevailing belief in Western circles that this awesome equipment--which demands great care to maintain--is prepared and stockpiled for use at the appropriate time by Soviet and other experts and military personnel upon Qadhafi's joining of the Warsaw Pact. At that time, he could carry out his plans and invade the Arab Maghrib. However, Qadhafi is acting in a stupid manner, because most of the equipment that he purchased for enormous amounts and paid for immediately have become covered with rust in the sands. Take, for example, the fact that out of 100 tanks he obtained two years ago in arms deals, only 10 remain operational. Moreover, thousands of vehicles are in storage and have not been used since they were unloaded from the ships. There are approximately 2,000 Soviet advisers who are not doing anything because the Soviet Union will only perform the role of arms supplier. It demands the highest prices for this equipment but at the same time will not assume responsibility for maintaining it. This is so that it will be able to sell additional weapons to this mad colonel.

In this way, the Russians are ridiculing Qadhafi. And in this manner, they are extracting--through arms sales--Libyan oil wealth.

Moscow would keep deceiving and brainwashing the colonel until he sees his fantasies as actual facts. It would then abandon him under the blows of bitter reality. This is exactly what occurred in connection with his recent unsuccessful attempt in Tunisia. The Russians let him be burned alone in the attack on the city of Gafsa. In fact, his aides counseled him to avoid this insane operation. Thus, his violent rage flared at having fallen once again into a treacherous Soviet trap.

Qadhafi has fancied--as is his wont--that Bourguiba's regime was liable to collapse merely by the execution of this operation, the seizure of the city of Gafsa by a handful of saboteurs, and the support of these saboteurs with supplies and equipment airlifted in by Libyan helicopters. His plan included the proclamation of a temporary "Republic of Gafsa" dependent on him, followed by an advance on the capital city of Tunis and the establishment of a union between Tunisia and Libya. These delusions and fantasies reflect the quality of the colonel's thinking and the factors behind his decisions.

Based on these things, European political circles feel that Qadhdhafi's insanity is particularly attributable to the strange ideas which dominate his mind and which he endeavors to put into effect at any cost despite their offensiveness to the intellect and their utterly fantastic nature.

The odd thing is that Qadhdhafi knows full well that his close associates and those who surround him do not concur with him in his ideas and plot against him in secret. He knows that they fill their pockets with millions of dollars, collect fabulous commissions on the arms deals, reaching as high as 60 percent of the cost of the weapons--'Abd-al-Salam Jallud being a case in point--and that they have at their disposal projects worth billions of dollars. Because of this, they escape at intervals from the life of austerity and confinement which Qadhdhafi imposes like a dictator in Libya, and go to London and Paris to immerse themselves in playthings, liquor and the red soirees. Meanwhile, he ignores their actions and turns a blind eye toward them so that they will leave him to his crazy fantasies and not oppose him in his plans for sabotage!

The serious thing is that Libya has been transformed in recent months into a center for the training of saboteurs and the sheltering of terrorist organizations. Eyewitnesses say that these foreign saboteurs are distributed among 20 training camps throughout Libya--from Tobruq to al-Bayda' to Tripoli--and that they are of conflicting types and various nationalities, including Palestinians, Tunisians, Yemenis, Moroccans, Africans, Japanese and European adventurers. Foremost among them are the Palestinians, especially those from George Habash's organization. There are no Russians or Cubans among these saboteurs since they perform other "military" duties in the operations organization belonging to the Libyan intelligence service.

The recruitment and training of these terrorists is supervised by the Liaison Office in Tripoli. This organization is considered a "state within a state" because it receives its instructions directly from Qadhdhafi and its budget is unspecified and unknown. The organization is run by an officer by the name of Ramadan 'Abdallah, a Qadhafi aide, who is assisted by another Libyan officer named Bashir Shamrun. The office, which has its headquarters in the People's Palace, is funded by the Libyan intelligence organization, while the General Command of the Libyan Army places the camps, weapons, trainers and mercenaries at its disposal. Qadhdhafi calls these saboteurs the "African-Arab Liberation Army." Forged Libyan passports and passports of all other nations are obtained for these saboteurs to enable them to carry out their operations abroad!

In addition to the Liaison Office, there is the Foreign Relations Office which is also located in Tripoli and performs the job of foreign contact with terrorist organizations in Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Africa and elsewhere. The man responsible for this organization is an officer by the name of Sayf Adam, one of Qadhdhafi's close associates. The office recruits these terrorists of all nationalities in coordination with the Libyan embassies. It is also in charge of supplying the groups of sabotage and terrorist commandos abroad with weapons and money. Haj Sayf Adam has

secret agents in many states, in most cases disguised as diplomatic personnel, businessmen, students or delegates. Qadhdhafi spends millions on these agents.

There is a third office--over the Liaison Office and the Foreign Relations Office--called the Office for the Exportation of the Revolution. This organization constitutes the prime mover of Colonel Qadhdhafi's foreign policy. It is headed by an official named Ahmad Salim, another of Qadhdhafi's aides. In cooperation with the two other offices and the General Command--along with its chief, Lt Col Abu-Bakr Yunis--the office plans all foreign operations, such as the Qafsa operation. Maj Mustafa al-Kharubi is in charge of the Intelligence Organization.

The Office for the Exportation of the Revolution--or to be more exact, the office for the exportation of sabotage and terrorism--has another secret mission. It carries out the recruitment of elements capable of assuming command of the sabotage operations abroad--and in particular the states surrounding Libya. It also participates in intelligence activity--to such an extent that it nearly duplicates the work of the Libyan Intelligence Organization. This has caused anger, grumbling and threats of resignation on the part of al-Kharubi because there are Soviet and Cuban experts who assist the chief of this office--whose code name is Qushat--and control its plans and contacts. However, Qadhdhafi himself oversees these offices and he alone decides on the required secret operations.

There are special weapons depositories belonging to these offices in the al-Khadrah camp which is located near Tripoli. These depositories are a virtual arsenal piled with weapons, from them the weapons go out to the sabotage camp and the terrorist movements outside Libya!

The serious thing is that the Soviet Union encourages Qadhdhafi in these ideas of sabotage.

The idea of establishing sabotage camps emerged following Qadhdhafi's recent visit to Moscow. Terrorists and mercenaries--the likes of George Habbash, Carlos and the Japanese Red Army organization--found in the idea of the camps a good opportunity to exploit the delusions of the colonel and extract millions of dollars which he squanders on such terrorist movements and organizations. At the same time, the Soviets found in these camps another opportunity to dispose of their weapons stockpiles in return for oil billions. They encouraged Qadhdhafi to supply and arm all the movements from Ireland to the POLISARIO to Nigeria, Chad and Zaire. Moscow's purpose behind this was to establish a center in Libya for the implementation of their plans and the exportation of troubles and disturbances to the states in the region!

The important thing is that all these dangerous activities and games going on behind Libya's borders are completely exposed to Cairo. The details of the plans of Qadhdhafi and the Soviets are observed one by one. And I can assert that Egypt's eyes are open and are not unaware of what is taking place along the Western Desert border.

If Qadhdhafi tries to play with fire again, and if he attempts to carry out an insane adventure in any place which threatens the security of Egypt and the safety of the region, then he will inevitably bear the serious consequences resulting from such foolish ideas. He understands well that the "Egypt of peace" has sharp fangs and armed claws. He cannot have forgotten the fatal blow he received in Tobruq in the summer of 1977 when the sky was transformed into a flaming inferno and the sands were set ablaze.

It was such a spectacle that Yasir 'Arafat, coming from Libya to Egypt that same day, could not forget the dreadful picture. He had witnessed the scene for a few seconds from his plane after it had taken off from the Tobruq base airport. When he landed at Janaklis airport, his face was pale from what he had observed. He said to those around him in a daze: "What have I seen? It was as if hell had opened its doors!"

In a subsequent article, I will penetrate deeper inside the fences of the 20 sabotage camps that Qadhdhafi has established throughout Libya.

What is going on behind the cordon of secrecy? How are the mercenaries hunted and how are the saboteurs recruited? How are they trained in the use of Soviet weapons by Syrians and Palestinians?

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LIBYA

TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS, COVERT LIBYAN ACTIVITIES REVEALED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 19 Mar 80 pp 8-9

[Article by Muhammad Wajdi Qandil: "What Goes On Inside the Sabotage Camps? Libya in the Dark is a Storehouse for Arms and Terrorists; Details of Qadhdhafi's Efforts to Buy the 'Atomic Bomb' from China and Pakistan"]

[Text] A serious phenomenon exists in Libya called "sabotage camps." What goes on behind the barbed wire fences of these camps is a dark mystery even for the Libyan people themselves.

The conception which prevails in international circles regarding Colonel Qadhdhafi, his dangerous games and his evil intentions is this: Libya has been transformed into a center for mercenaries, adventurers and swindlers and has become the seat of conspiracy, sabotage and terrorism in the area. Moreover, billions of Libyan petrodollars are spent without limit on any plans or deluded ideas having to do with the saboteurs and terrorists. For this reason, Qadhdhafi has become an easy mark for swindling and fraud operations by any terrorist band or organization purporting to be revolutionary.

This scandal has come to light through the confessions of one of the individuals accused in the Gafsa operation. He said: "'Izz-al-Din Sharif--the military commander of the 300-man assault group--met with Colonel Qadhdhafi before they left the special camp in Libya to conduct the operation against the Bourguiba regime in Tunisia. This was so that he could receive final instructions directly from the colonel. At the end of the meeting, Qadhdhafi warned the commander that as far as the commander was concerned, the mission was one of 'life or death in Gafsa!'"

Because of this, Qadhdhafi's reputation has reached a low point not only in the Arab region but throughout the world because he has become a source of extreme danger to world security and a symbol of anarchism and political madness. In the eyes of Europe, for example, Qadhdhafi has become a source which floods the world with terrorists, supplies them with money, arms and forged passports, and shelters them in Libya under his protection.

The sabotage camps are supervised by Cuban experts sent by Castro along with his brother, Raul, to train the mercenaries.

Perhaps the explosive conflict between Qadhdhafi and the PLO reveals the true nature of Qadhdhafi's intentions and ideas. For this is not a conflict over principles or goals but a struggle for control of the Palestinians and exploitation of their cause. The leaders of the PLO found out that the main purpose of all the millions of dollars and the financial aid they were receiving from Libya was to put the organization under the tutelage of Libya in the service of Qadhdhafi's plans of sabotage against the Arab and African states. When they objected--in particular the FATAH group--to being led into such activities because they were contradictory to the new diplomatic approach which the organization has recently relied on to help solve the problem, Qadhdhafi grew angry with them and declared war against the PLO and the leaders of FATAH.

Seventy-Five Million Dollars for Assassinations

It is no secret that Qadhdhafi had earmarked \$75 million for the PLO so that it would carry out a series of assassinations in the area aimed at specifically designated individuals. However, the PLO backed off from carrying out these operations, and the FATAH movement pressured the remaining extremist organizations--such as the PFLP--not to be led into such insane operations which would be damaging to the reputation of the cause, its movement and its international contacts.

Consequently, Qadhdhafi considered this a "swindling operation" on the part of the PLO. In addition, he found that its moderate policy had become an obstacle to his ideas. Thus he decided to replace the PLO with the Palestinian popular committees which Libyan intelligence forms through pressure and coercion to act in the service of the colonel and his plans of sabotage.

What is worse, Qadhdhafi imposes special taxes of 6 percent or more collected by Libyan authorities on the wages and salaries of Palestinians working and living in Libya. These taxes are levied on the pretext of helping the PLO, but the colonel now confiscates the tax money and turns it over to the rejection organizations dependent on him, including the likes of Habash, Hawatmah and Jabril. He has ordered the expulsion of all Palestinians who refuse to pay this tax and join the popular committees.

As (Jean Lartimie) put it in the French magazine PARIS MATCH: "Qadhdhafi had hoped that the Palestinians would carry out the destruction of the Suez Canal and blow up the oil wells in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. After Yasir 'Arafat had had his fill, he attacked the colonel sitting in his own tent, and reminded him that 'Arafat only needed Qadhdhafi's funds and did not want to have anything to do with his foolish nonsense!"

Qadhdhafi shouted back angrily to this: "After you have dealt with FATAH you find out what made the Lebanese prefer to join an alliance with Israel, and what induced the Syrian Army to shell them when it entered Lebanon. You know what compelled the Iraqi Government to fight them and King Husayn

to expel them from Jordan." Following this, Qadhdhafi expelled the organization's representative in Tripoli, cut off aid to 'Arafat and decided to dedicate all his assistance to the real terrorists backed by the Soviets. 'Arafat took to repeating everywhere: "He's crazy...crazy. Because of his abduction of Imam Musa al-Sadr, we are forced to keep an eye on a million Shi'ites in Lebanon. Khomeyni is suspicious of us because he believes that we are in collusion with this frivolous man!

Scandal of Black Horse Prison

And now, what goes on inside the 20 sabotage camps scattered throughout Libya? What is the mission of the Syrians and Palestinians who supervise the preparation and training of mercenary elements after the Offices of Liaison and Foreign Relations and Libyan intelligence agents bag them?

There is in existence a grave report by an eyewitness who was able to enter these camps and discover the training procedure and method of recruitment of the saboteurs: "These mercenaries, who number about 7,000, painstakingly enunciate the words 'imperialism,' 'masses' and 'proletariat' taught to them by Palestinians who are aides of Hawatmah and Habash, but they do not understand any part of what they are saying. The Syrians train them in the use of Soviet weapons. The largest of these camps are one located 20 kilometers from al-Bayda' and another near Tobruq in the province of Barqah. The mercenaries are trained in the use of antiaircraft guns and the Russian radar-aimed (Shilka) weapon under the supervision of the Syrians and Palestinians!

"The serious thing is that Qadhdhafi has put at their disposal special prohibited areas for the training of the mercenaries and saboteurs--particularly in the area of Jaghub Oasis in the desert extending along the Egyptian border. There is another area called (al-Kud) 476 which lies 476 kilometers from Benghazi. The same training takes place in other camps in the city of (Sinwayn), in Jud al-Dayim, and in the cities of Zuwarah and Bab 'Azizah. The Tunisians are concentrated in the latter city, where they learn how to use the Kalashnikov and to deliver political speeches. One of the Tunisian mercenaries whom I met in Tripoli said: 'The liberation of Palestine leads through Tunisia!' This is what Qadhdhafi has made them believe, and this is how the rest of the expatriate elements are inculcated. This man drives a Peugeot 504, which is the automobile reserved for Libyan intelligence personnel. He lives rent free in a furnished villa on the seashore and draws a monthly salary of 2,000 dinars. His assignment is to monitor the recruited Tunisian elements in the sabotage camps. The refractory elements are either banished or interned in the "Black Horse" prison on the Tripoli International Airport road or in a new prison established by Libyan intelligence 7 kilometers from Tripoli. This use of intimidation is a natural thing in Libya. So much so that one Arab ambassador filed an official protest with Qadhdhafi last July over the forced recruitment of his fellow citizens in these camps. The colonel did not hazard a reply to this protest in order to avoid a scandal, but the facts leaked out to all the embassies in Tripoli!

"The Moroccans, Algerians, Sudanese and Yemenis receive their training in the camps in Surt, Sabha and al-Zawiyah. In these camps, they learn the basic principles of guerilla warfare and the use of back-carried SAM-7 missiles. POLISARIO fighters in Western Sahara have obtained a large number of these weapons to counter Moroccan air raids. Dozens of convoys of trucks loaded with missile launchers, (Makarov) guns and antitank bazookas move every month. They pass through the border stations in Qadamas on the road to Western Sahara, which is called 'Qadhdhafi Road'!

"The natives of the southern Sahara who have been recruited in Libya are concentrated primarily in Zanjur and Qadamas. Others have come from Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Zaire and Ivory Coast--under various inducements--and have undergone training in the mistaken belief that they would return to their countries one day as invaders, as their Tunisian comrades did in the Gafsa operation. However, the devastating failure which the Tunisians met in their invasion attempt will make the others reexamine their awkward position, even though the colonel is preparing and training them to carry out his ambitions to gain control over the states of the "southern belt of the Sahara, such as Guinea, Mali, Zaire and Ivory Coast--this is the danger zone!"

Eyewitnesses report that Qadhdhafi's previous humiliation in Uganda left a bad impression on these mercenaries as well. The 500 fighters who were sent to help Idi Amin in March 1979 did not know the terrible fate which awaited them in the jungles of Uganda. These fighters of Libyan and other nationalities were transported to the southern Sahara and told that they were traveling to Malta to participate in its national holiday! But their plane headed south to Kampala and they fell into the trap of treachery. Qadhdhafi ordered the prosecution of those who returned and the execution of the wounded. He took the same position with the Gafsa operation group, and refused to allow them to belong to the "African-Arab Liberation Army" for evading the responsibility of participating in the unsuccessful operation. Those who saw Qadhdhafi at the First of September celebrations--as he reviewed in his conceit 7,000 of these mercenaries marching in the goose step and carrying bazookas--did not imagine that he could possibly snub them in their time of need! He admitted the same in an interview with the magazine DER SPIEGEL: "The movements that I help bear their own responsibility for their liberation."

Arms Depositories in Malta and Sicily

Because of this huge delusion which dominates Qadhdhafi, Libya has been turned into an arsenal heaped with weapons of every type and from every source. Hardly a month goes by in which Qadhdhafi's aides and brokers scattered throughout Europe and the Soviet Union do not conclude new arms deals. This is the secret of their sole loyalty to the colonel, because they collect commissions as high as 61 percent from these deals. Libya's involvement in a deal to purchase missile-equipped boats from a British company recently came to light. After Qadhdhafi had paid millions of pounds in advance for these boats, it was revealed that the company's chairman

of the board was a Zionist Jew who cooperates with Israel in armament activities. There was no chance to back out of the deal since the brokers had already collected their commission and tricked Qadhafi. The huge commissions collected by 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud from arms sales are no longer secret!

There are depositories set aside for these heaps of Soviet and other weapons. In some cases, the piles of weapons are set out in the open and suffer damage from sandstorms. However, the al-Khudrah camp located near Tripoli is considered the main depository for the arming of the sabotage camps as well as the sending of arms abroad.

Informed sources coming from Tripoli say that the weapons depositories are not just confined to Libya, but that Qadhafi has established three other main depositories outside Libyan borders. These are located on the islands of Malta, Sicily and (Malriva). From these depositories, the European revolutionary movements are supplied with weapons. These movements include the Irish Republican Army, the separatists in the Basque region and Corsica, the Red Brigades in Italy, and other movements even in the Canary Islands!

There is no longer any problem in obtaining Qadhafi's money and weapons. In every Libyan embassy there is a special office for liaison with all those seeking aid or assistance on behalf of the fight against Zionism and imperialism. The officials in these offices have blanket authorization from the colonel to pay any amounts--reaching into the millions--to these organizations or movements. They do not demand any receipts or vouchers for the huge sums expended. This makes it easy for Qadhafi's representatives to embezzle a large proportion of these funds. At the same time, Libyan diplomatic pouches are used to smuggle weapons into the European capitals for assassinations and sabotage operations. This makes the Libyan embassies weapons stations and depositories for all terrorists and dangerous individuals, and so they have come under the surveillance of most European intelligence organizations!

Qadhafi's Dream: An Atomic Bomb!

This is not the only threat to the security of the area posed by Qadhafi's thinking and his irresponsible designs.

There is something still more dangerous: his pursued dream of obtaining the atomic bomb. Qadhafi could become an extremely serious threat to world peace if his desire is fulfilled and this sick delusion which possesses him is realized and he acquires an atomic bomb at any price. It is no secret that Colonel Qadhafi once proposed to the late President 'Amal 'Abd-al-Nasir that he buy him an atomic bomb to use against Israel. 'Abd-al-Nasir realized the danger of such crazy thinking and was able to placate Qadhafi--temporarily, that is. He made him understand that this bomb is a two-edged sword of great danger and that he would not bear the responsibility of introducing it into the area.

Despite this, the colonel did not alter his terrible dream. He sent 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud, his number two man, to Peking to offer the Chinese leaders billions in financial aid in return for the atomic bomb--nothing more. But Chou En-lai apologized to Qadhafi's envoy very politely, while Mao Tse Tung told him that it is incumbent on every state to act alone and with its own resources, particularly in the atomic field! Qadhafi remained a prisoner of his dream, turning next to Argentina and Canada in an attempt to obtain this bomb at any price. He was met with refusal and apology. Then he financed the Pakistani bomb and took upon himself the task of supplying Pakistan with the uranium necessary to manufacture the bomb. Whispers circulate among those surrounding Qadhafi concerning the operation to steal uranium from the mines in Zaire, which are managed by a French company. Armored transport vehicles carried a quantity of uranium through the desert to Libya, and from there it was taken to Pakistan.

Qadhafi believed that he had by this means gotten close to his pursued dream. He hinted in his private conversations with the PLO delegation in Tripoli--before the conflict--and informed Gulf and Saudi rulers during his tour last summer that he had a big surprise which would make the Arabs happy and increase their strength. He said he would announce it during the First of September celebrations!

Thus, Qadhafi had hoped to obtain the "Pakistani atomic bomb" on the 10th anniversary of his seizure of power in Libya. However, the dream did not come true. The Pakistanis apologized that the bomb was not ready yet. It seems that President Zia-ul-Haq forgot his promises after he had obtained the money and uranium he needed. He was afraid for the fate of the bomb because of Qadhafi's evil intentions!

These are some examples of the unique Libyan ruler's thinking and his dangerous plans.

Under the violence of the regime of repression and terrorism, the discontent and agitation of Libyans against the foolish waste of oil funds and against such arbitrary measures as the steadily increasing nationalization of all property, including even barber shops, is growing. The newspapers have been transformed into publications printed on behalf of "the colonel" and his theories. His pictures are even printed on the plates in restaurants and hotels. Libyan intelligence agents encompass everyone under their surveillance.

The friend who came from behind the western border told me:

"Do you know what rules there? Fear!"

Libya has been converted into a big gloomy prison. Listlessness, fright and silence reign over its people, its cities and its homes. The sun hardly sets over the capital city of Tripoli before it is transformed into a "city of ghosts"!

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CSO: 4802

LIBYA SAID TO HAVE TRAINED SABOTEURS FOR MISSIONS IN EGYPT

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 18 Mar 80 p 9

[Article: "Acquittal of Two Citizens Who Disclosed Qadhdhafi's Sabotage Plans"]

[Text] The Supreme Military Court in Matruh, presided over by Col Bakr Tawfiq and including Col Ibrahim Huseyn and Maj Sa'd 'Umar as members with Col Fathi Qutb, chief military prosecutor in Matruh, in attendance, has acquitted both 'Abd-al-Hadi 'Allam Mayhub and 'Abd-al-'Ati Mu'min Da'bas, who were recruited by Libyan Intelligence to carry out demolition and sabotage operations aimed at a number of vital facilities inside the country. The purpose of these operations was to harass the Egyptian authorities and coerce them into accepting the plan drawn up by Libya's lunatic, Mu'amar Qadhdhafi, to annex the Egyptian Western Desert to Libya by force.

In its opinion giving the reasons for the acquittal of the two defendants, the court said that its decision was based on the articles of the law which give those citizens who deviate the right to turn away from crime and repent and disclose to the authorities what crimes they were charged to carry out prior to the commission of these crimes.

The two defendants slipped across the border in a truck with quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives supplied them by Libyan Intelligence to enable them to carry out its designs of terrorism and sabotage. The two men then surrendered themselves to the Egyptian authorities and made detailed confessions disclosing the criminal Libyan plans against Egypt and a number of other Arab states.

Feigned Agreement

During the various stages of interrogation and prosecution, the defendants explained that while they were working in Libya, Libyan Intelligence agents persistently followed them using all methods of intimidation until they pretended to agree to carry out the acts of terrorism and sabotage they were asked to undertake against Egypt.

Sabotage Camps in Libya

The defendants disclosed the locations of the camps for the training of saboteurs in Libya as well as the names of the officials in charge. They stated that the individual responsible for their recruitment was an officer in Libyan Intelligence by the name of Capt Muhammad Idris al-Shuhaybi. After the period of training in the use of weapons and explosives, this officer assigned them the task of slipping into Egyptian territory to carry out the terrorist plan drawn up by Libya's colonel. He armed them with a quantity of Soviet-made explosives weighing a total of 23 kilograms--the equivalent of a block of high-explosive TNT--and a number of defensive hand grenades as well as some light weapons and quantities of ammunition. These were concealed in bundles of fabric carried by the vehicle in which the defendants slipped across the border.

The two also confessed that at the head of the list of vital targets which Libyan Intelligence instructed them to destroy was the railway line between al-Sallum and Marsa Matruh.

Egyptian Security Knows

During their trial, the defendants said that they were surprised upon surrendering themselves to find that the Egyptian security organizations had been following their movements inside Libya even since their recruitment to carry out the criminal Libyan designs, and that these organizations are glad to receive any honest citizen who comes forward to provide information about a crime that he has been charged with committing by any foreign agency under the pressure of intimidation or enticement.

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CAIRO SEES MILITARY BUILDUP ALONG LIBYAN BORDER

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Mar 80 p 3

[Interview with Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces Lt Gen Ahmad Madawi, conducted by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im: "All the Facts Surrounding the Situation on the Egyptian-Libyan Border"; date and place not given]

[Text] Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi, the chief of staff of the armed forces, is one of those people whose depths you cannot probe until you get very close to them and follow the principle of listening until you know them.

When Gen Ahmad Badawi talked with me--his face inevitably brings to mind the bloody fight of the 3rd Army--I felt that he was a full-blown personality with many excellent qualities, foremost among them sincerity, clarity and integrity.

Two days ago, AL-AHRAM published a report from inside Libya dispatched by a Libyan brother. This Libyan says in his report that Colonel Qadhafi is building on the border with Egypt a line of defense fashioned after the French Maginot Line, the German Siegfried Line and the Israeli Bar Lev Line. This line, which will cost 1 billion dinars, begins on the shore of the Mediterranean and extends southward to Jaghbub Oasis, a total distance of about 300 kilometers!

Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi had just returned from the western zone (on the Libyan border) where he spent several days.

[Question] It was logical that my first question should pertain to the situation on the border with Libya. The man smiled, and said:

[Answer] First of all, I would like to point out here that the reason for my visit to this area was that our forces were carrying out the annual mobilization project. As is generally known, the chief of staff of the armed forces is the one who takes charge of directing projects at this level in field armies. There was no other reason besides this one.

[Question] We have heard that Libya under Qadhdhafi has been turned into a weapons arsenal?

[Answer] This is correct. It appears that Qadhdhafi wants to waste all of Libya's wealth and revenues to buy weapons which are far beyond the potentials and capabilities of his armed forces--or in fact, beyond the capabilities of the entire Libyan people. The serious problem is that the Soviet Union is exploiting Qadhdhafi in order to achieve its purposes in the region. It is the people there who are paying the price for this in the form of a drop in the income level. Economic problems have reached the point where there is a lack of availability of basic commodities despite the enormous national income enjoyed by Libya.

The ironic side of the situation is that we look on the Libyan people as a brother Arab people, and good neighbor relations should prevail between us. But this is the way Qadhdhafi wanted things to go.

These tendencies of his are clearly shown by the repeated aggressions in Chad, Tunisia, and even in Uganda. We had hoped that the weapons present in Libya, whatever their source, would be channeled toward the benefit of the Arabs and the security of their homeland, and that these weapons would be controlled by the armed forces and the nationalist elements in Libya. But unfortunately, the facts indicate that the opposite of this is true. And here some serious questions arise: Why this large stockpile of weapons? Who will use it? And against whom?

[Question] Could Qadhdhafi or whoever stands behind him be planning to use this weapons stockpile against us?

Our Forces on the Border Are Only for Defense

[Answer] This cannot be ruled out. This policy of Libya's which is not based on nationalistic goals or logic disturbs us. This has saddled Egypt and its armed forces with the additional burden of protecting our western border from this potential threat, because we will not allow anyone to encroach upon even a single inch of our territory. At the same time, however, I would like to assert here that we do not have any intention or leaning toward any acts of interference against Libya. Though we currently have forces in this area, they are solely for the defense of our western borders. We had hoped that there would not be a single Egyptian soldier--yes, we had hoped that not a single Egyptian soldier would stand where a brother Arab people exists.

But if the Libyan forces are currently building fortifications for defensive conditions, we all know that defensive conditions can change into offensive conditions. And another question arises here: Who is the decision-maker there? Is it the Libyan people? Is it Colonel Qadhdhafi? Or is it another state? This is what concerns us.

Another disturbing indication is that they are building air bases in the areas along the border, and they are building huge fortifications. But I say to them that if they are building these fortifications against Egypt, then they should save their money. Because we do not have nor could we possibly have any aggressive aims toward an Arab people. They should save their money for the sake of the people there and for the sake of the entire Arab people, which has enough problems.

[Question] But how did events unfold so quickly as to arrive at this point?

[Answer] There are three factors which interact with one another to create all the problems that arise in the area. These three factors are the Palestinian problem, the crises of leadership within the Arab world and the ambitions of the Big Powers.

All of us as Arabs were in agreement at the Rabat conference from the standpoint of goals, but we differed as to the means of achieving these goals. There was one orientation which said that America is against the Arabs and supports Israel, which has not given up one inch of the lands occupied since 1967. This viewpoint held that the way to liberate these lands is through war and weapons, for which we must rely on the Soviet Union as a basic source.

Egypt's Destiny in War and Peace

But if Egypt's destiny was to bear the largest and primary burden in all the wars with Israel, then it was natural that it should play the main role in the peace process initiated and formulated by President Sadat. Time has proven the correctness of his political perception as a national leader.

And now we see that the United States has become a primary source of modern and advanced weapons for us without any restrictions or conditions or any attempt to interfere in our policy. Of course, this did not please some of the other leaders in the area for whom there is nothing more important than trading on the Palestinian problem. Here foreign ambitions find an opening for themselves with an eye toward the resources of the area and its strategic importance. Naturally, these ambitions are completely incompatible with a solution to the problem in any form.

Thus, as you see, the problem is interwoven and its solution requires that the basic problem, which is the Palestinian issue, be solved first. This is what Egypt has done through war and through peace according to the international variables. We have been able through peace to regain most of Sinai, and this is certainly a positive achievement. Moreover, we are currently fighting a fierce battle to eliminate the wall of "fear and doubt" with Israel and establish the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. While this is taking place, the rejection states are offering nothing but insults and negative assertions.

Egypt has carried the burden of all the wars that have occurred between us and Israel, from the beginning until the end--from the beginning of the problem in 1947 and 1948. I was a junior officer then, and as soon as I graduated I went to Palestine in 1948. This is the destiny of Egypt, which throughout history from the time of the Tartars has constantly defended the region.

Egypt was the only state in the world that defeated the Tatars, in the Battle of Marj Dabiq in which Qutuz was trampled to death by horses. It was Egypt which defended the area during the Crusades. Egypt bore the greatest burden during the days of Salah-al-Din, and before Salah-al-Din. What did they do? What did they offer for themselves or anyone else?

But even more than this, it is Egypt which will rush to the aid of the Arab states when these ambitions are revealed to them and those dangers materialize of which we are aware now and about which we are concerned on their behalf.

Russia's Designs Have Never Changed

[Question] They once attacked us because of our friendship with the Soviet Union. Now they have joined in an alliance with the Soviets and they are still attacking us?

[Answer] Stranger than this is the fact that Russia's czarist designs have not changed even with the emergence of communism. Stalin demanded that the small states be considered colonies to be distributed among the big powers and he wanted Libya to be a Soviet colony. He said that no principles or doctrines stand in the way of the security of the Soviet Union. And now we see that the Soviet's goal has been attained with the help of Qadhafi in the 1970's many years after the famed Potsdam Conference.

As for us in Egypt, we obtained weapons from the Soviet Union, but when it became clear to us that it was trying to gain control over the reins of power and control Egyptian policy, President Sadat stood up and refused to accept all of this and expelled the Soviet experts at the same time that he was convinced we had no choice but to fight a war with Israel.

[Question] What is now the status of the Soviet weapons and equipment we possess?

[Answer] I believe that Egypt is the only state in the world which the Soviet Union has deprived of spare parts for weapons and yet has succeeded in overcoming these problems either through domestic production in the shops of the armed forces, or in Egyptian war factories, or through certain foreign companies in Western and Eastern states.

[Question] Broadcasts from Libya and the rejection states claim that some members of the armed forces are dissatisfied with the peace agreement.

[Answer] That has absolutely no basis in fact. And I wouldn't say just the armed forces but the Egyptian people as a whole. We in the armed forces appreciate the peace agreement more than others because we know the reality of war and at the same time we know the value of the lands which have been returned to us by the terms of the peace thus far. They are a preliminary step toward a solution to the main problem, namely the Palestinian problem, the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. No rational man plunges blindly into war for war's sake when he can achieve all of his rights without bloodshed.

[Question] Some foreign newspapers have published a story that American reconnaissance planes and airborne radar took off from air bases in Egypt.

[Answer] There will never be American basis in Egypt. But as the president announced, we provide facilities to the United States for the defense of the Arab states, and it is obligated to defend these states against any foreign threats. Of course, if America were to defend an Arab state it would be based on the request of this state. And while we grant the Americans the right to pass through our airspace, we grant other socialist countries the same right unless this conflicts with our security or the security of any other Arab state.

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LIBYA

EGYPT SEES LIBYA BUILDING HUGE DEFENSE LINE ON EASTERN BORDER

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21 Mar 80 p 5

[Article: "Qadhafi Earmarks 1 Billion Dinars to Erect a Wall Separating Egypt and Libya To Be Build Over a Period of 7 Years; Qadhafi: 'I Drew the Line With My Magic Wand and Named It the Wall of the Conquerer'"]

[Text] No remote observer can analyze the true nature of Colonel Mu'amar Qadhafi's innate make-up. His behaviour is strange, and his procedure in every action that issues from him leads to unnatural results. People both inside and outside Libya often laugh in ridicule at all the things that Colonel Qadhafi's speculations produce. There are some who take his concepts seriously and turn them into theories. These individuals are excused, because they take in return for what they give, even though what they give does not express the true nature of their perception of the reality of things.

But who would have imagined that this would happen in an Arab country? Who would have imagined that stupidity would take wastefulness so far as to give the impression that there are no people standing before the man who controls Libya's coffers and willfully squanders Libya's money as if it belonged to enemies?

Let's read together this letter which we received from inside Libya, from the very locations where more than 1 billion Libyan dinars is being squandered. The letter says?

A defense line called the "line of the conquerer" is now in the process of being constructed. It will become the largest impervious barrier between the sister states of Libya and Egypt. The line comes from the core of Qadhafi's thinking and is intended to prevent--so he believes--any invasion from the east. Scores of ships unload building materials--including cement, lumber, and reinforcing steel--as well as thousands of vehicles. Hundreds of workers and engineers build huge reinforced concrete blocks weighing nearly 30 tons each. These are moved with cranes, which line up four of the huge blocks, stack three more on top of these, add two more and finally place one block at the apex. Thus the line looks like a pyramid accompanied by all the component parts of barricades, obstacles and obstructions.

The line begins at the edge of the Mediterranean Sea in the Libyan town of Shannas between Tobruq and Musa'id (Kaytruwa), which is located near the imaginary line which forms the border between Libya and Egypt.

From here the line will extend southward toward Jaghbub Oasis 300 kilometers away. It will be built in 20 stages, each one 15 kilometers long. Construction of the line will take 7 years and will cost 1 billion Libyan dinars. Three international companies are to carry out the project.

The line will have one huge gate through which will pass the coastal road that begins in Morocco and extends through Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

The line had been extended 18 miles southward when its loans ran out last October. Work stopped for 3 months, and then Colonel Qadhafi approved new loans so the line could be completed on schedule.

Work is now in progress on extension of the line parallel to the border and alongside another line of electrified barbed wire armed with mines.

Last week, Mu'ammarr Qadhafi and Abu Bakr Yunis inspected the work on construction of the line and met with the workers. Qadhafi made a speech in which he said: "The enormity and impregnability of this line form a part of my extensive lines which I draw with my magic wand. I have named it the 'Wall of the Conqueror' so that it will remain in its fortifications a hundred times stronger than the famous lines of the world (Maginot, Siegfried and Bar Lev). It will close our eastern border completely and will remain a protective belt for the security of the Jamahiriyyah and the safety of its people from any invader or attacker."

Caught in a maelstrom of grief, the Libyan tribes in the eastern Libyan Desert say that this "Qadhafi line" will create great disadvantages. It will put an end to the movements of the tribes in the desert, pose a barrier to the movement of the nomadic Bedouins, and separate the citizens in western Egypt and eastern Libya who are united by common aspirations, goals, fraternization, religion, dialect, custom, traditions, descent, grazing, watering places, and social, psychic and religious bonds, and who are tied together by strong bonds which have not been broken in hundreds of years.

And so, Qadhafi is establishing a line to prevent any invasion to smash his regime and the rule of iron and fire which he now conducts with the Libyan people. The existence and extension of this line to sunder Libya and its sister state Egypt will turn Libya into a big prison.

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CSO: 4802

EDITOR OF ARABIC PERIODICAL DETAILS LIBYAN HARASSMENT IN LONDON

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 15 Mar 80 p 5

[Article including text of letter from 'Abd-al-Wahhab Fattal, editor in chief of AL-SHARQ AL-JADID: "Qadhdhafi Burned Our Offices, Kidnapped One of Our Editors and Set Fire to Newstands Which Oppose Him in London"]

[Text] In response to a story by our correspondent in London, Zaghlul al-Sayyid, which was published in AKHBAR AL-YAWM, the editor in chief of AL-SHARQ AL-JADID sent us a letter which he asked us to publish to show how Colonel Qadhdhafi is losing his nerves. Whenever a magazine or newspaper publishes any story against him or exposes some of his farcical actions, he sends his rowdies to attempt to terrorize the editors and writers of the periodical!

In its edition of 9 February 1980, AKHBAR AL-YAWM published a story about Qadhdhafi's rowdies who set fire to stands selling Arabic newspapers which expose the crimes of the Libyan president.

Qadhdhafi issued his orders for an editor of the London-based magazine AL-SHARQ AL-JADID to be kidnapped and sent to Tripoli. There he ordered that he be tortured to death. The editor was able to escape and return to his job safely. However, the colonel's attempts did not cease. He ordered what he believed were the offices of the magazine to be set on fire! Then he decided to waylay the editor in chief and attempt to murder him!

AKHBAR AL-YAWM has received a letter from Mr 'Abd-al-Wahhab Fattal, editor in chief of the magazine AL-SHARQ AL-JADID, describing new incidents involving Qadhdhafi's rowdies.

The text of 'Abd-al-Wahhab's letter follows:

Greetings in the name of God:

Should I thank God that we have been reduced [from editor in chief to author of] just a small story on the front page of AKHBAR AL-YAWM, or should I explain to you the facts about "Qadhdhafi's rowdies" who have burned newspapers in the streets of London?

The fact is, my dear colleague in the black [sic] profession which illuminates the right road for the people, is that this Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, who wants to bring democracy to the world through his illustrations book-- excuse me, I mean his Green Book, who wants to ensure freedom for the world, and who has set himself up as a god, a guide and a prophet, could not put up with this small newspaper of ours which welcomed both his supporters and opponents to say in it what they had to say. This newspaper also welcomed all Arabs to express in its pages what is in their hearts without having their remarks shortened, altered or changed. Qadhdhafi could not put up with this newspaper of ours. So, he tried with all manner and means of enticement to bring us into his ranks. However, we originated as a newspaper without advertising relying solely on the reader. We did not want to abandon the reader to please Qadhdhafi and sell ourselves to him as most of the newspapers both among the emigrant communities and at home have done. Thus, the only means he found to silence us was to attempt to set fire to what he thought were our offices on 22 June 1978. In 1979, one of our editors was seized and taken to Tripoli, but we got him back from there with great difficulty.

However, on 4 February of this year, London awoke to the news of a fire in Palace Gate and another in Park Lane. Of all things, Qadhdhafi's boys and adolescents had set fire to the fronts of two shops selling AL-SHARQ AL-JADID as well as Egyptian newspapers. They behaved arrogantly and aimed threats at the newspaper vendors saying that anyone who sold AL-SHARQ AL-JADID would burn. They did not mention the Egyptian newspapers.

This was the first stage of the vile and despicable plot. They thought that we would stop publication. They did not know that our newspaper has subscriptions all over the world. When the vendors refused to carry AL-SHARQ AL-JADID, we directed an appeal to our London readers through the other newspapers asking them to get in touch with us in order to obtain their copies. We were flooded with subscription requests.

Then the second stage of the plot began. The same distributor who distributes the Egyptian papers in London also handled AL-SHARQ AL-JADID as well as the magazine AL-HAWADITH. AL-HAWADITH withdrew distribution rights from him and gave them to an English company. Qadhdhafi's gang gave him distribution of Qadhdhafi's newspapers, and he circulated them among the newsstands saying that if he wanted to sell Egyptian papers he had to sell Libyan papers as well.

Thus, Egyptian newspapers are used as a winning card to get Qadhdhafi's newspapers put on sale in London. This might be going on in other

European capitals, as well. The British say here that they cannot let Qadhdhafi succeed in using this method to suppress the right to free speech. However, the British newspaper THE TIMES could be subjected to the same things that AL-SHARQ AL-JADID has been subjected to in the future. As of yet, however, they have not done anything.

Another thing I might add is that on the day the newspaper was burned in the streets, the drivers for the individual who distributes it along with the Egyptian and Libyan newspapers went around to the newspaper vendors taking the newspaper off the market and telling about the fire in an effort to intimidate the vendors. When the March issue of AL-SHARQ AL-JADID came out, the distributor's drivers went down to some of the stands to which he distributes and warned them about arson. These are facts. In an issue with a picture of Qadhdhafi on the cover under the headline "The Complex and the Colonel," the London-based magazine AL-HAWADITH stated that the same newspaper distributor collected 7,000 pounds sterling from Qadhdhafi's band. Rumors which are 99 percent accurate say that Qadhdhafi's band gave projects worth 60,000 pounds sterling so that he would play along with them.

What I have told you may be important. But even more important is what the distributor is reported as saying. When told that this action of his would force the Egyptians to withdraw the distribution rights to Egyptian newspapers from him, he responded, "The Libyans will make it up to me." How little he knows the colonel and his gang. How many promises they have made to Palestine and the Palestinians, and they were empty froth.

My dear Mr Sa'd: Qadhdhafi and his rats have not scared us by what they have done, because he does not know that we are stronger than him. Our sources about him come from the core of his intelligence organization and his gangs. However, my only purpose in writing this letter is to tell you that I did not want AL-SHARQ AL-JADID to remain just another one of the day's stories in AKHBAR AL-YAWM. The right to defend freedom of speech requires that this letter be published, if you would be so kind.

God grant you health and long life,

[Signed] 'Abd-al-Wahhab Fattal
Editor in Chief

Qadhdhafi's Strong-Arm Men in London

Qadhdhafi hires bands of strong-arm men who roam the streets of London and threaten the newsstands which display Arabic newspapers attacking Qadhdhafi's regime and policies.

One of these bands set fire to a newsstand in Mayfair, and the other newsstands have been threatened with the same fate. Some of the stands have stopped selling these newspapers and others have notified the police to search for these strong-arm men.

8591
CSO: 4802

LIBYA

SWEDISH AUTHORITY ADMITS TELUB COURSES' MILITARY POTENTIAL

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 13 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Hans O. Alfredsson: "Telub Libyans Would Preferably Become Teachers"]

[Text] The main office of Telub, a state-owned company, is in Vaxjo. It employs about 1,000 persons, including about 300 qualified engineers. The company works primarily with electronics of various forms, both for the defense forces and for civilian enterprises. Telub's skills have been put to use in many fields.

One of Telub's ideas is that of exporting training and similar services to the developing countries, according to Deputy Director Benkt Dahlberg. The agreement with the Libyan state on training of 100 youths is a link in this.

Telub also recently sold its remote control equipment for motor boats to Libya, an undertaking that has been criticized. Telub asserts that the equipment is to be used for civilian purposes.

Is the Swedish state party to the training of Libyan soldiers at a secret school in Vaxjo? The Libyan boys shake their heads: "We are not soldiers, we wish to become teachers." SVENSKA DAGBLADET has visited the school in question--a newly built technical school at the state-owned enterprise Telub in Vaxjo. Here, about 100 young Libyans, most of them under 20, will receive technical training for 4 years.

A secret school has been mentioned, and that the training violates Swedish foreign policy. Statements have been made to the effect that the youths were sent to Sweden by the Libyan armed forces.

The question has come up in the Riksdag, has been discussed at the cabinet level, and has produced inflammatory columns in the evening press.

Minister of Trade Staffan Burenstam Linder has assured the Riksdag that the training is completely civilian. The Telub management has said the same. And the boys from Libya give the same answer to SVENSKA DAGBLADET's question: "We have no ties at all to the military authorities."

Ministers Doubtful

Should the training nevertheless have been stopped? According to information available, the former three-party government thought so. Later as well, ministers have been in doubt. "If the government decided that this training should be stopped, we would have done so, of course," replies Bengt Dahlberg, executive director of Telub. He has had no doubt that Libya was involved, but last fall he stopped another offer, which, as he says had "obvious ties to the military."

"I did this as soon as I learned of it," he says. "I did not know that we had received this inquiry, and that we had made a preliminary offer."

The front page of this offer has been published. It speaks of direct offers to the navy, the army, and the air force. But according to Telub, this was a matter of a completely different project. The training now started is said to be civilian. Contact was made directly between Telub and the Libyan Ministry of Education. The contact intermediary was a Syrian who had received training in Sweden. Telub presented an offer and received the training contract in competition with other enterprises.

"But I can of course not guarantee that the boys are not soldiers," Bengt Dahlberg admits.

Nor does Lars Wigert, the school principal, deny that the knowledge acquired by the Libyans can be used for military purposes.

"It would not surprise me if some of them became radar technicians in the defense forces," he says.

Basic technical training--this is what the 4 years at Vaxjo will provide. The level will be approximately the same as that of a Swedish gymnasium engineer. Data, telecommunications, radar, and electronics are some of the subjects taught.

All teaching is in English. Most of the students, however, know almost no English, and an intensive course in English is therefore given at first. Seven language teachers have arrived from England and three mathematics teachers.

Following a basic course for all, the students are allowed to specialize.

About 20 percent of the lecture time is given to physical education.

The training and the cost of the students' stay is paid for by Libyan state, but nothing is said about what the students' knowledge is to be used for. The only requirement is that the students return to Libya at the end of the 4 years in Sweden.

Students Wish to Become Teachers

Mohammed, one of the older students, says that many of them wish to become teachers. "This is what our country most needs." "It is nothing unusual that Libyan youth is educated abroad. Today there are 60,000 Libyan students in various parts of the world," says Issam Soukhaita, the Syrian-born immigrant who helps the students during their first stay in Vaxjo. Many Libyans have already been educated in Sweden, in Malmo, among other places.

The students have themselves applied for the training in Vaxjo, later selected by the Ministry of Education.

They arrived in Sweden on 16 March. They had hardly landed before they discovered what a sensation they had already caused. "We were almost shocked," says Mohammed.

"We should like to meet Swedes and associate on friendly terms with them," says Bashig, another student, "This could be of value to both peoples."

The cost of the new school in Vaxjo, with housing, was about 20 million kronor. It is intended that it will be used permanently for training of this kind.

For Telub it is a matter of pure business. Bengt Dahlberg refused to reveal the amount of money involved, but a couple of hundred million kronor has been mentioned.

Over the next 4 years, Telub must also hire about 30 new employees.

To the young Libyans living in Sweden involves a great adjustment. None of them knows any Swedish. In the dormitories and day rooms of the school Arabian music booms from loudspeakers. The students have a special room for prayers, where they can practice their religion.

But they have looked around in Vaxjo, and at Easter time they made an excursion to Karlskrona.

"We live Vaxjo," says Mohammed with a smile.

11,236

CSO: 3109

LIBYA

BRIEFS

TELUB AFFAIR IN SWEDEN--Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET 23 Apr. The matter of the 100 Libyans at Telub in Vaxjo has been taken up by the Riksdag constitutional committee. Riksdag member Anders Njorck has posed the question in the so-called decharge, i.e. the way in which the Premier conducts his office. On Tuesday the committee was called upon by Hadar Cars, minister of trade of the People's Party government, and on Wednesday Karin Soder and Telub chief Bengt Dahlberg are to be heard. The question concerns whether the Swedish Government should have stopped the training, since indirectly it could be said to involve support of the Libyan armed forces. Cars attempted to stop the project, which he thought violated the guidelines for Swedish exports of war materiel. Cars submitted the matter to then Premier Ullsten. The conclusion was that there was no constitutional warrant for the government to stop the project. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Apr 80 p 8] 11,256

CSO: 3109

KINGDOM CURBS ENTRY OF FOREIGN WORKERS; DISCOURAGES TRAVEL OF WOMEN

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 10 May 80 pp 14-15

[Text] Saudi Arabia's Interior Minister Prince Nayef has called for a cut in the number of foreigners coming to work in the Kingdom and warned of the dangers of Saudis mixing in non-Moslem society.

Three quarters of Saudi Arabia's workforce is foreign, according to unofficial estimates, and Prince Nayef, quoted by the Saudi Press Agency, said "The Islamic community is being attacked by people of other religions who reject the beliefs of Islam and wage war on them.

"They are waging ideological war against us by various methods. They have tried to show the virtues of their own faith and failed. So now they are trying to emphasize the negative aspects of Islam and forget its positive features", he said.

Saudi Arabia, a vigorous defender of Islam, last month asked the British ambassador to leave Jeddah after British television screened "Death of a Princess", an attempt to reconstruct the case of a Saudi Princess shot for adultery in 1977.

Prince Nayef, speaking at a seminar in Riyadh Tuesday night, warned that Saudis studying abroad were in danger because of their contacts with Western society and called for fewer foreigners to be brought to work in the Kingdom.

Prince Nayef said the interior ministry was studying ways of helping Saudi employers to give priority to Moslem foreigners when looking for workers.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have shown concern at the large number of foreign workers and the problem of illegal immigration. Prince Nayef said last October that Saudi Arabia had deported thousands of illegal immigrants. The United Arab Emirates decided in January to tighten its labour regulations and gave foreigners until June to put their work papers in order or be expelled.

Bahrain's Labour Minister Sheikh Issa bin Muhammad Al Khalifah told the UAE news agency earlier this week that his ministry was studying ways of restricting certain professions to Arabs and called for curbs on the number of Asians working in the Gulf.

Meanwhile the Beirut-based newsletter The Middle East Reporter said Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia has issued orders barring Saudi women from travelling abroad to study.

The Middle East Reporter said the orders were published last week in the Saudi newspaper Al Jazira and distributed by an Egyptian wire service.

Even women accompanied by their husbands will henceforth be forbidden to travel abroad to study, the newsletter quoted Prince Fahd as ordering.

It said the orders were believed to have been prompted by the controversial love affair between Princess Misha, who was executed in 1977 along with her suitor on charges of adultery.

CSO: 4820

NEW REGULATIONS GOVERNING FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT ISSUED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 3 May 80 pp 14-16

[Text] New regulations concerning Foreign capital investment have been enacted in Saudi Arabia by virtue of Royal Decree No. M/4, dated 2.2.1399H, (1979). The following is the decree of extenso.

Article 1: In this regulation, "foreign capital" shall mean coin, currency notes, bills of exchange, machinery, equipment, spare parts, raw materials, products, means of transport, intellectual rights such as patent rights, trade marks and similar rights, when owned by a natural person who is not of Saudi nationality or by a corporate person whose shares capital are not completely owned by Saudis.

Article 2: Without prejudice to other regulations, investment of foreign capital shall be subject to an authorization of the Minister of Industry and Electricity, upon recommendation of the Investment Committee, provided that it satisfies the two following conditions:

- a. That it shall be invested in development projects which, as regards this Regulation, do not include oil and metal extraction;
- b. That it shall be accompanied by foreign technical expertise.

Article 3: Development projects shall be determined by order of the Ministry of Industry & Electricity, upon proposition of the Investment Committee and in accordance with the development plan.

Article 4: A committee of the foreign investment capital shall be set up in the Ministry of Industry & Electricity, and shall be composed as follows:

- The Permanent Secretary of Industry & Electricity Ministry, or his substitute in his absence, as chairman;
- a delegate of the Ministry of Planning;
- a delegate of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy;

--A delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water

a. All privileges enjoyed by national capital under the Protection and Encouragement of National Industries Regulation, concerning industrial projects only.

b. The exemption of the industrial and agricultural project in which foreign capital is invested from income and companies taxes, for a period of 10 years. Other projects shall be exempted from these taxes, for a period of 5 years.

Projects already exempted at the date of execution of this regulation shall benefit from the exemption hereof.

This exemption is accorded on condition that the participation of national capital shall not be less than 25% and that such participation shall be maintained during the period of exemption.

The exemption shall run from the date of production starts.

The Council of Ministers may modify the provisions of this paragraph.

c. The acquisition of the necessary real estate in accordance with the Ownership of Immovable Property by Non-Saudis Regulation.

Article 8: Without prejudice to the provisions hereof, projects benefiting this regulation shall be subject to the Labour, Social Insurance and other regulations in force in the Kingdom.

Article 9: The disposition hereof shall not apply to projects, in which foreign capital is invested, in the following cases:

a. If the projects already existed regularly before the promulgation of this Regulation and if, nevertheless, the continuation of such projects or the increase of the capital invested therein, shall make them subject to the provisions hereof.

b. If the projects were authorized to operate in the Kingdom by virtue of a special agreement.

Article 10: Any establishment licensed under this Regulation, which contravenes the provisions hereof, shall be warned by the Minister of Industry & Electricity to comply with such provisions within a period to be fixed by him. If the establishment fails to comply with such warning, the said minister, upon recommendation of the Investment Committee, withdraw the licence granted to the establishment or liquidate it completely. The minister may, upon the recommendation of the said committee, instead of

revoking the licence order to deprive the establishment from all or part of the privileges provided for in this regulation. However, the interested parties may appeal the decision of the Minister to the Grievance Board within 30 days from the date of the decision is notified by official means. The decision of the Grievance Board in this matter shall be absolute and final.

--A delegate of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.

--A delegate of the Ministry of Commerce.

The rank of each member shall not be less than grade 10. The Head of the Investment Bureau at the Ministry of Industry and Electricity shall assume the functions of general secretary of the Committee. The Minister of Industry and Electricity shall appoint a legal adviser to the Committee. The Committee may seek the opinion of any expert it wishes to hear, provided that such an expert shall not be entitled to vote. The deliberations of the Committee shall not be valid unless with four members of it, among them should be the Chairman. The Committee's deliberations shall be secret and decisions thereof shall be taken by a majority of votes. In the case of equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. The Committee's decision shall not be final until approved by the Minister of Industry and Electricity.

Article 5: The Committee shall be competent in the following:

- a. To propose development projects.
- b. To examine the investment applications.
- c. To examine any complaints or claims submitted by foreign investors or other interested persons arising from the application of the terms of this Regulation, and to submit recommendation on the subject to the competent authorities.
- d. To recommend the penalties which, in its opinion, must be inflicted to any establishment contravening the provisions hereof.
- e. To examine the draft regulations necessary for the implementation hereof.
- f. To examine matters pertaining to the provisions hereof, referred to it by the Minister of Industry and Electricity.

Article 6: The Foreign Capital Investment Bureau at the Ministry of Industry and Electricity shall furnish all the necessary information, explanation and statistics requested by persons wishing to invest foreign capital in the Kingdom. The said Bureau shall also facilitate and complete the formalities relating to licensed foreign capital. The Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior shall grant licensed investors, their employees and workers, entry and permit visas and residence permits.

Article 7: The foreign capital, which has fulfilled the conditions provided for herein, shall benefit from the following privileges:

CSO: 4820

STUDENT UNION REPORTEDLY STAGES DEMONSTRATION

Capetown MUSLIM NEWS in English 25 Apr 80 p 12

[Text]

An event not reported by major news agencies and newspapers is the recent sit-in protest in front of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in London by more than 50 students representing the Islamic Union of the Students of Saudi Arabia (in the United States and Europe). The students submitted a petition to the Saudi Embassy with their demands but Saudi embassy officials refused to accept it.

Following the sit-in the students, in protest, went on a hunger strike for three days at the South Bank Polytechnic in London. The strike ended with a sit-in front of the United States Embassy.

The student protest came after the first disclosure of massacres in Saudi Arabia's eastern province in Qateef and Ahasa when 60 people were shot dead during the month of Muharram. In addition 300, including women and children, were injured and 1100 were arrested.

The Saudi authorities took action after demonstrations were held in support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and to express anger towards the United States, which has several bases in Saudi Arabia.

It is reported by reliable sources that Saudi troops were assisted by US Commandos and that tanks and bombs were used.

The London demonstration was the first the Saudi regime faced outside the country. The IUSSA claims that there have been no protests by Islamic institutions and organisations since "they have been bought - through financial dependence - by the Saudi regime."

Demands

The following demands were presented to the Saudi Embassy in London after the sit-in protest by the Muslim students of Saudi Arabia in the US and Europe.

1. We demand an immediate end to the wave of indiscriminate arrests in Qateef and Ahasa (in the Eastern Province) and the release of all political prisoners, especially those arrested in the Eastern Province while practicing the religious rites of Ashoora (Muharram).

2. We deplore dictatorship and terror and demand that an Islamic constitution be introduced to secure democracy and progress for the people. There is no constitution - written or unwritten - in Saudi Arabia.

3. Our Muslim people in the Arabian Peninsula, regardless of sect, is but one people condemning the regime's sectarian and devisionary policies of inciting Shi'as

and Sunnis against each other. We demand an end to this wicked colonial policy.

4. We demand reduction in the rate of production of oil, recently raised to a mad figure of 14 Million barrels a day, although the authorities only admit 9.5 Million.

5. We demand social justice in the country to put an end to the conditions of poverty and privation which the majority of the population suffer all over the country.

6. We demand that the secret treaty signed by the Saudi regime and the U.S. be abolished, we strongly object to the establishment of new American military bases and demand the close of those two already in Dhahran and Tabook.

We are hopeful that the International Public opinion, International Human Rights institutions, and Peace Loving Nations of the world will respond and support the struggle of our people against the dictatorship of the Saudi regime and for the accomplishment of our legitimate rights.

Islamic Union of the Students of Saudi Arabia 8th January 1980.

DEVELOPMENT PLAN SHOWS PROGRESS IN EDUCATION

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 3 May 80 pp 3-5

[Text] Recognising the importance of the human element in the growth process special attention is being paid by the Saudi government to the development of human resources in the Kingdom.

Efforts in this regard are not merely confined to spreading education and improving the health and improving the health and general capabilities of the people alone.

They are rather directed towards bringing about a healthy transformation in the very life pattern and attitudes of the community. This is reflected in both the size and distribution of public investments over the successive budgets in the last ten years.

Not only the total allocations to education and manpower training health social security and social welfare and information have been raised substantially they have also been so distributed as to meet the planned requirements of each of these sectors adequately.

In the budget for 1979-80 total allocations for these sectors were raised to SR 26.3 billion compared with SR 24.3 billion in the previous year, thus constituting 16.4 per cent of the total budget.

Government educational authorities have continued to exert all possible efforts in building schools of different levels all over the country, establishing new colleges; and institutes in the main cities, preparing and training Saudi teachers, recruiting expatriate teachers and supporting educational institutions technically and administratively.

Within five years, budgetary allocations for education have risen nearly five-fold from Rls 3760 mm in 1394/95 to \$ls 16,269 mm in 1399/1400. Of the allocations in the current fiscal year, Rls 7,629 million or 47% is for the Ministry of Education, Rls 3,238 mm or 20% for the General Directorate for Girl's Education and Rls 5,402 mm or 35% for the Ministry of Higher Education and Universities. The underlying objective is to

expand the educational base with a view to support maximum student enrolment at elementary and intermediate levels and also make higher education also accessible to every one who desires to have it and fulfills the basic requirements.

Along with the expansion of educational facilities, efforts are also being made to improve the quality of education by upgrading educational curricula, improving educational methods and techniques and raising teaching standards through regular teaching-training courses and seminars.

During the academic year 1397/98, the number of students (both boys and girls) at different levels of education rose by 79,422 or 7% to 1,212,453. Preliminary information indicates that the enrolment increased further by 11% to about 1,350,000 in 1398/99. The number of teachers increased by 9.2% to 62,700 in 1397/98 compared with 57,410 in 1396/97. During the year, more than 1,200 new schools and 6,300 classrooms were opened; this means that more than 3 new schools and 17 additional classes were opened on each day of the year.

In the field of technical education, the number of students and teachers rose by 9.2 and 21% to 4,967 and 852 respectively. The number of schools increased from 22 in 1396/97 and the number of classrooms from 221 to 248. The average cost of a student in the field of technical education worked out to Rls 16,666 in 1396/97 which exceeded substantially the general average cost per student. This indicates the importance that the government attaches to the quality of technical education in the Kingdom. To uplift further the level of technical education, the Government is also importing technical experience from advanced countries.

In the field of adult education, every effort is being made to eradicate illiteracy from the Kingdom. Towards this end, the budgetary allocations have been raised substantially from Rls 14.3 mn in 1392/93 to more than Rls 113 mn in 1397/98.

A 20 year anti-illiteracy program to be carried out in five stages was launched by the Ministry of Education in 1393. This program includes the opening of a national anti-illiteracy center for preparing studies and materials for popularizing literacy among the adult illiterate and organizing regular programs every summer for educating Bedouins.

Girl's education has witnessed considerable progress during 1397/98; 175 new schools and 1,706 additional classrooms were opened at primary and post primary levels. The number of female teachers at both levels rose by 13% from 16,320 to 18,405 while that of girl students increased by 8% from 345,054 to 372,496 and constituted 36% of the total number of students at these levels in the Kingdom.

The enrolment at female adult teachers' training institutes rose from 5,618 in 1396/97 to 9,341 in 1397/98, registering a marked increase of

66%. To accommodate the increased number of trainees, seven new institutes were opened and the number of female teachers was increased to 635 from 431 in 1996/97.

In the area of female adult education, the number of enrollees reached 31,211 compared with 30,348 in the previous year; 68 new schools and 234 classrooms were added thus raising the total number of schools and classrooms to 1,819 and 2,228 respectively.

Recognising the importance of educational support facilities in improving the quality of education, the Ministry of Education has embarked upon a big project of introducing audio-visual aids in all the schools in the Kingdom. The project, which will cost more than Rls 100 mn, will greatly improve the standard of educational services.

The Ministry's school meal program, which was originally introduced in the 1991/92 school year and was initially confined to five districts benefiting about 18,000 students at a total cost of about Rls 3 mn, has been extended to 23 districts with a total number of about 667,000 students at a total cost of Rls 763mn.

CEO: 4820

ROC AGREES TO TRAIN POLICE, SECURITY PERSONNEL

Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 1-2 May 80 p 2

[Text]

JEDDAH, April 30 — The Republic of China agreed to train Saudi Arabian personnel in police and security work, the Chinese Interior Minister said Wednesday.

Chuang-huan Chiu told Arab News that the training would take place by means of short or regular courses. The minister also said the two countries agreed that officials and officers of both ministries should exchange visits more frequently and at various levels.

Saudi Arabian personnel would be trained in various disciplines according to the recommendations of the ministry, he added. "Taiwan — the island province of the Republic of China is one of the most peaceful countries in the region," Chiu said. "Social security is very good and there are relatively fewer crimes than elsewhere."

Chiu added that the dissidents who were put on trial in Taiwan recently were accused of subversion that went beyond fair political opposition. "They tried to subvert the state and the regime," he said.

Nationalist China opposes the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and could not forecast what might happen in the region because of it. "But I know that the Soviet Union is naturally aggressive and threatening," he said. "And it is up to the free world to resist and thwart this aggression through unity and solidarity in the face of such provocation."

At a press conference in Riyadh Tuesday Chiu said Saudi Arabia and China laid down a firm basis for cordial relations and solid cooperation in political, economic, technical and other fields. He said he had fruitful talks with his host, Interior Minister Prince Naif and other senior officials connected with the reorganization of internal affairs of the two countries. His talks also covered the status of Muslims and he reaffirmed that his government gave special attention to its Muslim population.

Chiu said he admired the Kingdom's development plans and the security of the country which was the result of wise leadership and guidance, he told the conference.

Chiu arrived in the country on an official visit to return the visit made to the Republic of China by Prince Naif last year.

Prince Naif told newsmen last week that there was a wide scope for cooperation between the two countries in security matters. He said China has good training facilities. There are already Saudi Arabian personnel training there.

During his visit Chiu had talks with government leaders and inspected the New Jeddah Clinic, which is manned by Chinese experts.

GOVERNOR PRAISES EXTENSION OF PORT FACILITIES

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 May 80 p 2

(Article by Alan Kenney)

[Text] Jeddah, May 2--Mecca Governor Prince Najed visited the Jeddah Islamic Port Thursday to inspect the port's facilities and projects currently under construction. After the tour, Prince Najed told ARAB NEWS the port will play a distinctive role in the next five-year plan.

"The Islamic Port will play a much larger role than it played during the second five-year plan because the country is developing and for each area there are public utilities that must have their needs met," he said. He added that the port is designed to meet not just the needs of the area, but is designed "to meet the requirements of the country at large." In addition he said the port will live up to expectations of national interests.

The governor expressed satisfaction regarding the efforts of port officials. "What I have witnessed reflects the improved services achieved at the port through the projects contributing to the prosperity of the people, a thing we all seek," he said.

Prince Najed was received by Dr. Fayez Badr, president of the Saudi Ports Authority; Faud Makhtar, director-general of Jeddah Islamic Port, and other senior officials.

Makhtar said the Port Authority has the flexibility to cope with the needs of the five-year plan by means of its sister ports in Jizan and Yanbu.

Makhtar said when plans for the Jeddah Islamic Port are completed, the port will be able to handle 22-24 million deadweight tons. And though the port still has a way to go to reach that capability, port capacities are being enlarged steadily.

In 1980, the port was handling 12.5 million deadweight tons per year, and this year it is estimated the port will handle 15 million deadweight tons.

Mokhtar also said the port is continuing to add sophisticated equipment to handle cargo more of their cargo quickly. "The consignees now are getting better at collecting their efficiently. The improvement of facilities will enhance the port's importance, he said.

In addition, the Ports Authority has acquired a 10-million-square-meter section of land south of Jeddah for helping consignees store cargo. "The Ports Authority has developed one portion of 1 million square meters and has written to the Chamber of Commerce to have this allocated to merchants after they put forth the proper proposals. We are considering this as a relief for consignees and merchants and a replacement for warehouses now cluttering the city," Mokhtar said.

However, Mokhtar said the port, still suffers from consignees not taking charge goods, but we are still suffering because consignees are not taking cargo within the first 10 days." The port doesn't charge for the storage of cargo in the first 10 days after unloading.

"Also, some consignees are bringing cargo in weak and torn bags--especially grains. It is spoiling the port's beauty and marring its cleanliness. The port has a high level of cleanliness. We want to maintain this fact, so we want consignees to put cargo in strong bags," the director said.

CSO: 4820

PORT PROBLEMS SEEN AS ROOT OF INFLATION

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 23 Apr 80 p 3

[Text]

JEDDAH, April 22 — The Director General of the Saudi Ports Authority, Dr. Fayez Badr said the ports of the Kingdom hold the key to the rate of inflation in the country.

If the ports remained open and functioning well, there should be no fear of a high rate of inflation generated locally, he said.

Badr was speaking before a large audience of university students and others at the university lecture hall Monday. At the end of his speech he welcomed questions from the floor, which centered mainly on the functions of the ports in the country.

Under Badr's leadership the ports were decongested in record time and waiting time for ships fell from as high as 90 days to zero. No ship now has to wait to unload cargo at any Saudi Arabian port, a feat of management that has been acknowledged worldwide. Badr himself was voted administrator of the year by an American magazine.

He said that unregulated government spending will lead to inflation, but whatever government and the private sector spend will not cause much of an inflation here as long as the ports remained open and imports entered the country smoothly and quickly.

"We import 90 per cent of all requirements," he said. "When demand rises we must import more of a certain commodity and until we do that its price will also rise. But if we import it and unload it swiftly, the price will return to normal."

From a technical point of view, he said, as long as the ports were efficiently run and capable of handling all the country's imports there should be no inflation and whatever inflation occurs will have been caused by external factors.

The ports in this country are "similar to lungs, the bigger their capacities, the better their services to our prosperity and progress. But the smaller the lungs, the worse off we shall be."

Badr said the present generation of Saudi Arabians are accountable to the coming ones as far as mineral resources are concerned. "Since oil is a depletable resource and is in fact depleting we should think of the forthcoming generations and what kind of natural and mineral resources they will have as we have had oil," he said.

It is not wise, he added, that we should use up all our resources because once they are depleted, we shall not be able to continue living the way we are. He urged leaving some of the country's mineral resources where they are at present for the benefit of those who will live here later on.

Asked about price control Badr said he opposed the regulation of prices because it is in the hands of the consumer to decide on which merchant was profiteering and avoid dealing with him in the future.

BRIEFS

PETROCHEMICALS PLANS--Saudi Arabia has set its sights on capturing 4 per cent of the world's market for petrochemicals, Industry and Electricity Minister Dr Ghazi al-Ghosaibi declared last week. Dr Ghosaibi was speaking at a ceremony for the signing of a joint venture between Exxon and the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) to build a \$1 billion petrochemical plant in SABIC's industrial zone at Jubail (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, April 28). Dr Ghosaibi stressed that Saudi Arabia was not setting out to dominate the production of petrochemicals. "It is satisfied to accept a reasonable share not exceeding 4 percent of world production, and I don't believe there is any fair person who could argue that such a percentage is unreasonable or unfair," Dr Ghosaibi said. Dr Ghosaibi emphasised that Saudi Arabia was determined to carry through its programme of industrial development according to plan. He also warned that the Kingdom would not accept any discrimination in the form of trade barriers against Saudi Arabian products. "It's time for the producers of petrochemicals in the world to welcome Saudi Arabia as a new partner in industrial activity," he said. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 3 May 80 p 6]

BANNING OF BOK FIRMS--Saudi Arabian authorities have banned the South Korean firm Hyundai Construction Corporation from doing business in the Kingdom for two years, the Saudi Arabian daily AL-RIYADH reported last week. The company was also fined \$900,000 for violating anti-corruption laws and a Hyundai executive was jailed for 30 months last December for "trying to pay off a government official," AL-RIYADH said. According to AL-RIYADH, all Saudi Arabian companies and foreign firms operating in Saudi Arabia have been forbidden to deal with Hyundai while the ban is in effect on pain of being fined. The threat presumably covers only business dealings involving Saudi Arabia, although this was not spelled out in Al-Riyadh's report. As AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO revealed in its issue of December 10, 1979, Hyundai's troubles stem from a bizarre shooting affray between local representatives of the firm and Saudi Arabian intelligence agents. A Saudi Arabian Defence Ministry authorities, who set a trap; the Hyundai representatives became suspicious when they arrived at the ministry and drove away; during the subsequent chase, they were alleged to have exchanged fire with pursuing intelligence agents. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 12 May 80 pp 7-8]

BRIEFS

SWEDISH BUILDING MATERIALS--SVENSKA DAGBLADET 16 Apr 80. Eleven small enterprises in Malmo, owned by Fosie Industrial City, with about 500 employees and an annual turnover of 350 million, coolly counts on being able as early as this year to establish themselves as Sweden's largest exporters to the oil country of Oman. "We have gotten very far in negotiations with an enterprise group in Oman, the Al-Mutawah Trading Company, and count on being able to sign an agreement some time in May," says Director Bengt Modig, coordinator for the small Malmo enterprises. Oman imports practically all technology, giving oil in exchange. Al-Mutawah Trading Company last year purchased building materials abroad to the value of 200 million. It is part of this pie Bengt Modig and the small Malmo enterprises hope for. The Fosie group reckons with exporting finished and semifinished building products. "We are ready to open a kind of warehouse for building materials in Oman and place our own manager there," says Bengt Modig. Only 15 percent of Swedish exports goes to the Third World. Japan leads with 40 percent. Sweden has thus far missed Oman. [Text] (Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Apr 80 p 33) 11,256

CSO: 3109

1980 FEDERAL BUDGET MAY PROVIDE ANSWER TO OVERSTAFFING

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 28 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Mohamed Amer]

[Text] Abu Dhabi, April 27 (Ittihad)--The 1980 federal budget issued recently does not include new posts exception in some cases.

Does it mean a closure to recruitment? When will the government conduct a comprehensive survey of the country's manpower needs?

An analysis of the first chapter (salary and wages) of 1979 budget reveals that allocations totalled Dh. 2231.5 million while, according to the Finance Ministry Dh. 1793.4 million of 80.4 per cent of the funds were spent. Jobs were 40,791 civilians and 15,438 military ranks.

When the draft budget for 1980 was prepared at the end of the 1979, it was discovered that 7,500 civilian posts and 588 military ranks were still vacant.

Despite this, the ministries asked for funds to fill 17,000 civilian jobs and 4,500 of the armed forces, indicating a growth rate of 41.7 per cent and 29.1 per cent respectively.

At this stage the government could not accept this immense number of employees either civilian nor military, according to Finance Minister Hamdan bin Rashid. He said the situation should be reviewed.

This situation in chapter 1 of 1979 federal budget resulted in chapter 1 of the 1980 budget without any new vacancy. How?

The logical situation in such cases is the "individual reorganisation." The human element represents the main component of the production process for having a direct influence on the society.

Individual reorganisation means a study of the post, its specifications and the suitability of the employee.

If we do not accurately execute the process we will reach the stage of employment inflation which is the most dangerous disease of the governmental administrative body. Because if the government does not recruit the required individual who has the qualifications and experience considered essential for the post, it will be forced to recruit several individuals to perform one job.

What is the government's reply to the ministries' request for recruitment of 17,000 new employees?

The government has begun implementing the individual reorganisation according to the following steps.

--The first chapter of 1980 budget did not include any new recruitment.

It decided to conduct a comprehensive survey of manpower in the country to specify the size of it and its present and future.

The government will prepare an organisational structure to the country's administrative body.

The study includes specifying the vacancies actually needed by the ministries.

The government did not close the doors of employment for there are 7,300 vacancies from past years' allocations in addition to the new vacancies due to resignations or promotions.

On the other hand the 1980 budget does not stop new recruitment but has only tightened it.

Although the 1980 federal budget does not include allocations for new recruitment, there are a lot of vacancies.

CSO: 4870

STATISTICS SHOW INCREASE IN INVESTMENT EARNINGS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 28 Apr 80 p 3

[Text]

Sharjah, April 28. The investment of million in Sharjah's processing and converting industries over the past two years has started to pay off handsomely in foreign earnings.

This is reflected in the phenomenal rise in the emirate's exports and re-exports whose average monthly figures for the first quarter of this year were almost three times last year's monthly average.

Trade sources here attribute the increase less to the temporary Iranian trade boom and more to the fact that export-oriented industries set up in the last couple of years have managed to develop steady markets in neighbouring Gulf countries other than Iran and there are prospects of further expansion. The lead has been taken by the emirate's ice cream factories whose exports rising by 50 per cent over last year are on the way to making up the majority of the annual turnover. The bulk of ice cream exports have been going to Qatar, followed by Bahrain and Kuwait. Negotiations are understood to be going on for the extension of a lease one franchise to Saudi Arabia.

A 50 per cent increase has also been registered in the export of scrap metal with Pakistan emerging as the main customer.

Figures released by the statistics office at Port Khalid show that the emirate exported foodstuffs, consumer goods, durables and commodities valued at 385.228 million dirhams in the second half of last year. The upsurge came in the first quarter of this year with the monthly average amounting to 154 million dirhams. A fair chunk of the exports was made up of Sharjah processed foodstuffs and commodities such as ice cream, detergents, paints and chemicals. Trade sources say the success of these industries in establishing markets in neighbouring countries is bound to encourage more and more entrepreneurs to locate in Sharjah.

As a consequence of the rising volume of business, both local and foreign, the present accommodation of the Sharjah Chamber of Commerce and Industry which processes certificates of origin and other export documents, has been found to be inadequate. The Chamber is therefore expanding premises into adjacent accommodation which will be ready for use in a few weeks time.

PANEL COMPLETES MILITARY CONSCRIPTION LAW

ABU DHABI EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 May 80 p 1

[THAT]

Dubai, May 11 The parliamentary committee charged with drafting the outline of the country's military conscription laws completed its task at a final meeting held here this morning under the chairmanship of Ahmed Saeed Ghoheish, head of the Defence and Interior Committee.

The recommendations which cover the entire field from the age and period of conscription to training programs and conditions of compulsory service will go in the form of a report to the Federal National Council. The FNC, it may be recalled, had set up the committee late last year.

If the plan for compulsory military service for able-bodied national youths who have completed their education goes through, the UAE will become the second Arabian Gulf country to have conscription which so far exists only in Kuwait. The recommendations, it is understood, call for the drafting of youths in both officer and lower rank cadres, depending on the educational choice of the individual youth.

Hamad Bou Shihab, Deputy Speaker of the Federal National Council, who also attended today's meeting, told newsmen later that in its final session, the Defence Committee discussed the formulation of its recommendations with Defence Minister Sheikh Mohamed bin

Rashid. Details of the laws which are expected to have considerable impact on the country's defense strategies, will be determined by the FNC in the light of the Supreme Council's guidelines on the matter.

Besides Ahmed Saeed Ghoheish and Hamad Bou Shihab, the meeting was attended by Butti Obaid, Saleh Al Shail, and Abdullah Amin, all FNC members.

Itihad adds Defence Minister Mohamed bin Rashid said the proposed law was aimed at preparing the youth for national tasks. "All nationals must be ready to take up arms to defend our nation in the face of external dangers," Mohamed said.

Committee rapporteur Saith Ahmed Al Shail said the amendments set the draft age at 18. This will permit students to continue their higher education before being drafted. Conscription will end, according to the bill, at the age of 35.

Shail said the conscription bill would cover pupils who had discontinued their education for 18 months.

Conscription for university students will end when they reach the age of 32 years. Higher education students must be drafted before reaching the age of 35.

The committee set 60 per cent disability as equal to martyrdom for draftees.

LAW GUARANTEES MEN, WOMEN EQUAL SALARIES

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 2 May 80 p 3

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, May 11 (WAM) Men and women in the UAE will have equal salaries, according to the new labour law approved recently by His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. Labour and Social Affairs Minister Saif Al Jarwan said in a television interview.

The interview on Abu Dhabi television this evening was part of a program "Dialogue with an official" in which high-ranking government officials answered enquiries by journalists and citizens.

The Minister said the law defined the work for women "in a way to preserve her dignity."

Jarwan stressed the importance of organizing work relations between the employer and the employee at state level. He considered the step as a basic factor to ensure stability and peace for both as well as to define each one's rights and duties.

The law also defines pensions, leave and the labourer's rights in the event of partial or complete disability or death. The compensation ranges from 10,000 to 35,000 dirhams.

The Minister explained that the new labour law would solve several problems, the most prominent of which being visa trading, insurance cover for labourers affected by the bankruptcy of the companies they work for will also be provided in the new law.

He said that the Labour and Social Affairs Ministry was currently studying a suggestion to exclude Palestinians and Afghans from "sponsorship transfer law" after the deadline on June 21.

The law prohibits labourers and employees from changing their sponsor except for seven categories of people including doctors, technicians, experts and advisors.

A new list will be issued shortly, Jarwan said.

The Minister confirmed that his country was implementing the Arab League's resolutions regarding priorities to Arabs working in the UAE.

"This does not mean that we should get rid of manpower from foreign countries with whom we have friendly relations," the Minister concluded.

REORGANIZATION OF FARM LAND REPORTED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 24 Apr 80 p 1

(Text)

Dubai April 23 (Itihad) Vice-President and Prime Minister His Highness Sheikh Rashid bin Saoud Al Maktoum has received a report from Agriculture and Fisheries Minister Saoud Al Raghani on the boundaries of the country's agricultural regions and their planning for the purpose of distribution of agriculture services.

The report divided the agricultural areas into four:

1. The western agricultural region, which includes all the lands of Abu Dhabi emirate.

2. The central agricultural region which includes lands from the northern emirates (Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and Ras Al Khaimah). It is bounded by the border of Abu Dhabi and northern emirates with Oman in the south, the western part of the UAE and Oman mountains in the East, Azin border in the north and Umm Al Quwain, Ajman, Sharjah and Dubai coasts in the west.

3. The eastern agricultural region, which includes the lands on the eastern coast of the country (Fujairah Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah). It is

bordered by the central region's border with Oman in the south, the eastern coast in the north and the UAE and Oman mountains in the west.

4. The northern agricultural region which includes most of Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah lands. It is bordered by the Central region in the south, Ras Al Khaimah mountains in the east, the border with Oman in the north and Ras Al Khaimah coast in the west.

The report said that the agricultural regions include about 10,812 farms of which 1,686 are in the western region (Abu Dhabi) plus 980 in Al Ain, 2,561 in the central region, 2,367 in the northern region and 3,218 in the eastern region.

The report added that the increase in the number of farms since the establishment of the Agriculture Ministry totalled 3,290.

The Minister said in his report that the wells which needed to be drilled total 1,413.

The report estimated agricultural loans needed for this year at Dh. 80 million.

THIRD STAGE OF MINERAL SURVEY TO START SOON

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 26 Apr 80 p 3

[Text] Abu Dhabi, April 25 (EN)--The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources today announced that it would start the third stage of its mineral survey "in the near future" after the discovery of large quantities of mineral ore in the northern emirates.

Director of minerals department at the Ministry Saleh Al Matroudi said that the Ministry would undertake feasibility studies in the local market and sites of mineral deposits and would also study the possible start of mining operations.

A report of the second stage of the survey, completed after 20 months of field work, showed commercially viable quantities of copper in Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah, chromite in Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, and talc in Fujairah. Manganese was found in Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman and Umm Al Quwain.

It may be recalled that on Wednesday last Supreme Council member and Ruler of Fujairah His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Mohamed Al Sharqi received Minister of Electricity and Water Humaid bin Nasser Al Owais and discussed with him the eastern coast's requirements of water and power services and projects envisaged up to the end of 1982.

The Minister had then informed Sheikh Hamad that a plan was under way to provide a 100 km. long coastal area, stretching from Diba to Khor Fakkan, with water and power services.

Al Owais affirmed that the existing water and power problems would be solved before next summer when a number of artesian wells would be drilled and three power stations in Diba, Qadfa and Fujairah, each with a capacity of 10 MW would become operational.

The impacts on the UAE economy as a result of mining copper, chromite, manganese and talc need not be overstressed. Besides enabling the state to diversify its sources of income, mining operations will also give a

boost to nationals' aspirations to man key positions in the field of industry.

Copper is a good conductor of electricity, while manganese is essential for the steel industry. Tale is a basic ingredient of cosmetics.

If the feasibility studies were to be encouraging, there is good scope for diversifying the sources of UAE's income which is mainly reliant on exports of oil.

Moreover, if the deposits were to be sizable, prospects are bright for exports particularly of copper.

The price of copper on the London Metal market today was about \$1,000 a tonne.

CSO: 4820

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN IMPORTS--Abu Dhabi, May 11 (WAN)--Abu Dhabi imports last year rose by 22.8 per cent as against those in 1978, according to statistics released here today by the emirate's customs department. Abu Dhabi imported 7.75 billion dirhams (2.08 billion dollars) worth of goods as compared to (6.3 billion dirhams (1.695 billion dollars) in 1978, the figures showed. Japan topped the list of exporters to the emirate with goods worth 1.304 billion dirhams, followed by the US (1.208 billion dirhams), Britain (1.169 billion dirhams), West Germany (880 million dirhams) and France (652.6 million dirhams). Kuwait came first among Arab exporting countries to Abu Dhabi with goods worth 302 million dirhams followed by Lebanon with 152 million dirhams worth of goods. According to the statistics, Japan maintained her place as the biggest exporter to the emirate of Abu Dhabi while the US edged out West Germany from the second place. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 May 80 p 3]

BANNING OF CO-EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS--Abu Dhabi, May 11 (UPI)--Co-education above the kindergarten level will be banned in private schools in the UAE once the new regulations drawn up by the Ministry of Education and Youth are implemented, newspapers reported today. Some 30,000 students and 1,130 teachers and administrative staff will be affected. The 70 private schools in the UAE cater in the main to the children of the country's expatriate population. And statistics made available by the Ministry suggest that 35 per cent are Arab nationals, 25 per cent Pakistanis, 23 per cent Indian, 10 per cent British, with the balance being made up of other nationalities. Only schools run by international institutions or diplomatic missions are entitled to apply for exemption from the new rules. The move is seen by educationists in the country as a further step by the Ministry to model the country's schooling system along traditional Muslim lines, where co-education above kindergarten level is not permitted. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 May 80 p 3]

ARMED FORCES LAW--Dubai, May 12 (Ittihad)--Conscripts while they are in military service will be entitled to all the benefits applicable to the Armed Forces, such as salaries, promotions and annual increments, according to the draft law on compulsory military service. Whenever an individual is

called up for military duty, he will be placed in the rank just above that which he graduated and will also be paid a draft allowance, an official source said. Employees in government departments or companies when recalled for military duty will continue to get those salaries and the Armed Forces will pay any salary difference that might result, in addition to the draft allowance. The conscription bill entitles the conscripts to all the allowances and promotions of his civilian job and the conscription period will be computed in his civilian record. The source said a draftee injured or martyred during call-up will be subject to the pensions law applicable in the Armed Forces but there will be no deduction of two per cent of his salary through the conscription period. The conscript is eligible to the leaves stipulated in the law and for cash given in lieu of such leaves. He can also join adult education courses in the evening. [Text] (Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 13 May 80 p 2)

LARGE OFFSHORE OIL CLAIM--The Ruler of Ras-al-Khaymah, one of the poorest states of the UAE federation, last week claimed that a huge offshore oil-field had been discovered. So far, Ras-al-Khaymah, the most northerly Emirate, has produced no oil or gas, although a 150,000 b/d refinery, part financed by Kuwait, is under construction. Samir Maqdad, a representative of Gulf Oil (Ras-al-Khaymah), said that the existence of reserves of hydrocarbons had been established during 17 months of prospecting. He gave no details, except to say that the first well onshore, at Al Jiri, was expected to go to a depth of 14,000 feet. The development would cost 20 million Dirhams (\$5.4 million), he said. This would make it the deepest well in the area and possibly the deepest in the Gulf. The deepest wells to date are in the offshore Mubarak field in Sharjah (12,990 feet) and in Abu Dhabi's offshore Mubaras field (11,000 feet). The former is producing about 25,000 b/d of 37° API gravity crude. The Gulf Oil subsidiary is working a concession in the Emirate in collaboration with Amoco Ras-al-Khaymah Oil Co. Sources close to the joint venture said that drilling in Al Jiri near the Emirate's international airport, was likely to take three months. The discovery of oil there could indicate oil-bearing land as far as the disputed border with Oman, the sources said. [Text] (Paris AL-SAHAR ARAB REPORT & NEWS in English 12 May 80 p 11)

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

YEMENI STUDENTS TO PAKISTAN--Karachi, 4 Apr--The federal minister of education has agreed to admit 172 students from North Yemen to Pakistani universities. It is learned from reliable sources that the administrative agency for Karachi region colleges has sent necessary information about admission to Northern Yemen via University Grants Commission. According to these sources, these students can be admitted to colleges in Karachi and Hyderabad regions. These students can be admitted in August when the new academic year begins. It should be remembered that North Yemen had requested the Saudi Arabian government to award scholarships to these 172 students. The Saudi government had refused admission to these students as the academic year had already begun. However, it had agreed to give scholarships to these students if they attended colleges in other countries. North Yemen had decided to send these students to Moscow for studies. However, according to the newspaper AL-MASHRIQ AL-AWSAT, Yemeni government officials reviewed their decision, fearing that this step might damage their country's relationship with Saudi Arabia. After consultation with President Ali Abdallah Salih, they decided to send these students to Pakistan. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 3 Apr 80 pp 1, 6] 7997

CSO: 4203

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